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CALIFORNIA’S RECALL IS NOT OVERPOWERED
David A. Carrillo, Joshua Spivak, Natalie Kaliss & Jared
Madnick*
The recall is one of three direct democracy tools in California.
Following the failed 2021 recall attempt against California Governor
Gavin Newsom, the state recall process has been criticized for evolving
beyond its intended purpose to the point of being overpowered and prone
to abuse. After reviewing the recall’s original intent, we conduct a
quantitative analysis of state and local recall attempts in California and
compare this to other recall states. We conclude that the critique is
unjustified. In California and elsewhere, state official recalls are
frequently attempted but rarely qualify for the ballot, demonstrating that
the existing recall system is an effective filter. We validate the charge
that the recall is primarily a tool of out-party interests, but conclude that
this is an intended design feature rather than an unanticipated defect.
We conclude instead that California’s local recall is the better target for
reform efforts, given its comparatively easier qualifying requirements,
greater use, and higher success rates. Rather than deviating from its
intended purpose, in its 110 years the California state official recall
proved to be exactly what its Progressive designers intended: a voter
weapon to menace and remove public officials, but one that is difficult
to deploy. We frame the recall as less about politics and more about
policy: recalls function as public opinion or policy polls and overall tend
to validate existing policy. Finally, we conclude that most proposed
reforms are solutions seeking a problem, and that California’s recall
system merits just a few small procedural changes. The upshot is that
the view of California’s recall as a force gone amok is incorrect.

* David A. Carrillo is a Lecturer in Residence and the Executive Director of the
California Constitution Center at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law.
Joshua Spivak is a Senior Fellow at the Hugh L. Carey Institute for Government Reform at
Wagner College and a Senior Research Fellow at the California Constitution Center. Natalie
Kaliss and Jared Madnick are research fellows at the California Constitution Center.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recall is a century-old direct democracy tool for voting out an
elected official before their term ends. This article addresses three
issues: how California’s state and local recall processes perform,
whether the California recall process is overpowered, and the merits of
certain proposed reforms to the state recall. To evaluate claims that
California’s recall is overpowered, we analyze all California state-level
recalls and a sample of local-level recalls and compare those California
data with data from other recall states. From that quantitative analysis
we conclude that in California the recall has been employed often and
with significant success at the local level, and less frequently and with
less success at the state level. Given those results and the experience of
other states with various proposed reforms, we conclude that most
proposed changes to California’s state-level recall are at best
unwarranted, and at worst, will neuter the recall.
At the state level in California the recall is frequently attempted but
rarely successful. From 1911 to 2021, California voters filed 179 recall
petitions against state officials; only 11 qualified (6% of filed) and 6
succeeded (54.5% of qualified), resulting in 5 recalled legislators and 1
recalled governor.1 The other 173 petitions either failed to qualify or
were rejected at the ballot, an overall 96.6% failure rate.2 This shows
that recalls rarely qualify or result in a vacated office, which rebuts
claims that the recall is overused.
At the local level the recall is attempted even more than at the state
level and with greater success.3 We analyzed all California local recalls
from 2011 to 2021 and found that in 555 completed recall drives, 139
petitions qualified (25% of filed) and 86 (61.9% of qualified) succeeded
at the ballot.4 The 469 petitions that either failed to qualify or lost at the
ballot constitute an overall 84.5% percent failure rate. Other states
mirror this result, where the vast majority of recall attempts never reach
the ballot.
Our review of a decade of local California recalls shows that far
more recall petitions are filed at the local versus the state level, that local
1. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS 1 (n.d.),
https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/recalls/ca-recall-history.pdf [hereinafter COMPLETE LIST OF
RECALL ATTEMPTS].
2. Id. Data for Figures 1 to 5, Table 1, and state-level recall statistics provided by the
California Secretary of State publication COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS.
3. Recall of State Officials, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 15, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-of-state-officials.aspx
(“Historically, recall attempts at the state level have been largely unsuccessful. The recall is
used much more often, and with more success, at the local level.”).
4. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1, at 16-18; see infra tbl.3.
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recalls are significantly more likely to qualify and to succeed than state
recalls are, and that the local overall success rate (15.5%) is 5 times the
state overall success rate (3.4%). This supports our conclusion that the
state recall is not overused—it pales in comparison to the robust local
recall. But even the local recall is used infrequently compared to the
thousands of elected positions subject to the recall in California.
Finally, we analyze various proposed reforms. We conclude that
California could benefit from some recall process reforms and that other
proposals would weaken or end recalls in California.
II. RECALL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
A. The recall in general
A recall is a procedure for removing and replacing a public official
by plebiscite before that official’s term ends.5 It is a political process in
which proponents file a petition, gather signatures, campaign for their
position, and seek a win at the ballot.6 Nineteen states and the District
of Columbia permit recalling at least some state officials.7 At least 41
states and the District of Columbia permit local recall elections.8 Recall
states all share several basic elements:
 Proponents apply to circulate a recall petition; some states require
stating grounds.

5. Recall of State Officials, supra note 3.
6. See CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 14-15. See generally DAVID A. CARRILLO & DANNY Y.
CHOU, CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 161–62 (2021); David A. Carrillo, Stephen M.
Duvernay, Benjamin Gevercer & Meghan Fenzel, California Constitutional Law: Direct
Democracy, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 557, 568 (2019).
7. Recall of State Officials, supra note 3 (listing the following 19 states: Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wisconsin); see also JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE RECALL: TRIBUNAL OF
THE PEOPLE 21 (State Univ. of N.Y. Press 2013) (1997). Virginia has a unique process: it
requires citizen petitions, but after the required number of signatures is verified, a court
conducts a recall trial to decide whether the official will be removed from office. Authorities
differ on whether this counts as a recall procedure.
8. There is no consensus on this figure. Compare the 30 states listed in Recall of Local
Officials, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/recall-of-local-officials.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2022), with the 39 states listed
in Laws Governing Recall, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Laws_governing_recall
(last visited Mar. 30, 2022). Yet the numbers are higher: for example, Vermont is listed in the
no-recalls column, but had one in Underhill on October 19, 2021. It is unclear if New
Hampshire allows recalls, but it is on the books for certain jurisdictions. See Kimberly
Houghton, Nashua parents seek to oust school officials over remote learning, N.H. UNION
LEADER (Jan. 17, 2021), https://www.unionleader.com/news/health/coronavirus/nashuaparents-seek-to-oust-school-officials-over-remote-learning/article_1651b452-55fd-51e8bca5-89ae806a519e.html.
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 Proponents must gather a number of signatures in a period of
time.
 Election officials verify that the signature threshold is met.
 A recall election is held, and if it succeeds, a replacement
procedure applies.
The recall makes representative government more responsive to
majority will.9 This is consistent with California’s expressly voterdirected government.10 The recall is often accurately described as a
weapon. Progressives called it the “gun behind the door,” opponents
called it the “hair-trigger form of government,” and California Governor
Hiram Johnson asked, “How best can we arm the people to protect
themselves hereafter?”11 The ballot argument framed the recall as the
power “to remove a dishonest, incapable, or unsatisfactory servant.”12 It
also described the recall as a means to require a public servant “whose
stewardship is questioned . . . to submit the question of his continuance
in office to a vote of the electors. If a majority of all voting at the election
say that their servant is unfit to serve them longer, he is thereby
retired.”13 From their inception in California the recall and other direct
democracy powers commanded strong public support and were adopted
by large majorities.14 Periodic calls to abandon or weaken the recall are
commonly met with “strong popular disapproval.”15 Modern polling

9. FREDERICK L. BIRD & FRANCES M. RYAN, THE RECALL OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 3
(1930); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 111 (“The device clearly is a constant reminder
sovereignty resides in the voters.”).
10. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“All political power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to
alter or reform it when the public good may require.”).
11. The Progressive reforms were contemporaneously described as “significant and
useful weapons of democratic control.” BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 2. Woodrow Wilson
also used “the gun behind the door” metaphor. Id. at 10; see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7,
at 1. William Howard Taft used the hair-trigger comment in his book, POPULAR
GOVERNMENT: ITS ESSENCE, ITS PERMANENCE AND ITS PERILS 81 (1913). Hiram W.
Johnson, Governor of Cal., First Inaugural Address (Jan. 3, 1911),
https://governors.library.ca.gov/addresses/23-hjohnson01.html.
12. LEE C. GATES & WM C. CLARK, REASONS WHY SENATE CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT NO. 23 SHOULD BE ADOPTED (1911), https://repository.uchastings.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=ca_ballot_props.
13. Id.
14. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 13; BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 54; see also BIRD
& RYAN, supra note 9, at 362 (“The public is too well satisfied with the sense of security
which the existence of the recall conveys to permit it to be discarded. As a defensive weapon
of democracy it apparently has come to stay.”). The recall was approved by a vote of 4 to 1;
it received the second largest vote and won by the largest majority out of all 23 proposals on
the October 10, 1911 special election ballot. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 13; BIRD & RYAN,
supra note 9, at 54.
15. BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 7.
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shows that the electorate still strongly favors its direct democracy
powers.16
B. Designing a recall system
We frame recall systems as choices between availability and
integrity.17 A recall should be easy enough to deploy that it is both a
credible threat to a targeted official and a realistic means for the voters
to remove that official.18 Yet ballot integrity must be protected so that
the process is not abused. There is a subjective element here. Elected
officials, for example, are likely to view the recall as too easy to use,
given their self-interested view that the electorate should not be
empowered to vote out officials. Voters are likely to be unhappy with
how costly and time-consuming it is to gather enough signatures to
qualify a recall for the ballot, given their self-interested view that it
should be easier to achieve their political aims. And there is a normative
question here about what constitutes a bad elected official.
The answer to these subjective and normative questions is that (like
other direct democracy tools) the recall is a mechanism to enforce
majority will, with the underlying assumption that the majority’s will is
the conclusive answer. Thus, the electorate’s decision to retain or recall
an elected official is itself the answer to the normative question: recalling
an official proves that a majority viewed them as a bad public servant.
Accordingly, the question about whether it should be more or less
difficult to secure that voter opinion turns less on how easy or hard the
recall should be to use, and more on practical effects of a recall system’s
design: whether that design makes the system prone to abuse, or if the
design makes the recall impractical to use at all.
C. Genesis of the California recall
In 1911, California Governor Hiram Johnson and his legislative
allies proposed that the voters adopt the recall along with two other direct

16. CARRILLO & CHOU, supra note 6, at 626. Commentators similarly disfavor diluting
the recall: “because the people are sometimes vanquished by their own weapon is no
justification for depriving them of so desirable a potential means of protection.” BIRD &
RYAN, supra note 9, at 351.
17. This question dates to the recall’s origins in Los Angeles in 1903. See BIRD & RYAN,
supra note 9, at 90. “The flexibility necessary for the useful functioning of any democratic
instrument makes the abuse of those instruments possible.” Id. at 351. Others frame the
tradeoff as between public empowerment, accountability, and participation versus
government control, insulation, and efficiency. See CARRILLO & CHOU, supra note 6, at 561.
18. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 135 (1989).
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democracy tools: the initiative and referendum.19 In Progressive circles
Dr. John Randolph Haynes was considered the recall’s primary mover.20
Nearly all existing literature describes Los Angeles as the first California
city to originate the recall in 1903.21 Yet we found evidence that San
Diego had a recall law in its 1889 charter; it is unclear why sources in
that period ignore this.22 Supporters praised these innovations for
returning power to the voters to use against wealthy and influential
political interests, primarily the Southern Pacific Railroad.23
The Progressives intended that the new direct democracy tools
would “give to the electorate the power of action when desired, and . . .
place in the hands of the people the means by which they may protect
themselves.”24 Assemblyman William Clark argued that the recall “is
an essential step in the movement in this State to place its government in
the hands of the people—a necessary part of the machinery that makes
possible a government of the people, by the people, for the people.”25
The Progressives intended that direct democracy would ensure that
political power remained in the electorate’s hands, allowing them to
make policy, rescind government actions, or remove corrupt officials
from power between elections.26 Thus, the recall’s intended purpose is
for voters to hold elected officials accountable.27 California voters
overwhelmingly (76%) adopted the recall in October 1911.28
19. WINSTON W. CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 4
(Haynes Found. 1950) (1939); FRANKLIN HICHBORN, STORY OF THE SESSION OF THE
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE OF 1911, at 42-43 (1911).
20. See TOM SITTON, JOHN RANDOLPH HAYNES: CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVE (1992).
21. See DONALD MUSCH, THE RISE OF ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER THE FALL OF GRAY
DAVIS: RECALL ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2004). The recall in another form
existed in the Revolutionary-era United States. JOSHUA SPIVAK, RECALL ELECTIONS: FROM
ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO GAVIN NEWSOM 20-21 (2021). The Articles of Confederation
contained a recall provision, as did the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. The recall was proposed
in the Virginia Plan and voted down at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Id.
22. CRONIN, supra note 18 notes that smaller jurisdictions had it without naming them.
Wake County, N.C. Election Board Member Gerry Cohen discovered that San Diego had the
recall in its charter in 1889 as noted in Anna Johnson, Could Raleigh hold a recall election?
It’s rare and complicated but mostly possible, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (June 23, 2021,
2:55
PM),
https://amp.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/
article252276538.html. See generally San Diego, Cal., City Charter (Mar. 16, 1889),
https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/city-clerk/pdf/archives/1889a.pdf.
23. See HICHBORN, supra note 19, at 227.
24. Id. at 57.
25. The Recall Amendment: Meeting of June 14, 1911, 6 TRANSACTIONS
COMMONWEALTH CLUB CAL. 158-59 (1912).
26. LARRY N. GERSTON & TERRY CHRISTENSEN, RECALL!: CALIFORNIA’S POLITICAL
EARTHQUAKE 5 (2004).
27. The recall was adopted by 76% of voters. Id. at 2-3.
28. SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 31. Of the 22 amendments on the ballot in that election,
the recall garnered the most votes and was passed by the second largest margin, with 76.82%
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D. California’s recall system
California’s government is designed around the belief that the
people possess supreme political power: “All political power is inherent
in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and
benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good
may require.”29 These powerful direct democracy tools cause some
observers to describe the electorate as California’s fourth branch of
government.30 That perspective should inform our view of the recall
system the Progressives designed—particularly regarding complaints
that it is too easy to use.
The recall system designed by Johnson’s Progressives is largely
unchanged since 1911.31 It is “the power of the electors to remove an
elective officer.”32 Recalls are initiated by filing a petition, which may
state a reason; this is optional because sufficiency of reason for a recall
is not reviewable.33 The persons who file the recall petition and gather
signatures to qualify it for the ballot are known as the proponents. Recall
petitions must qualify for the ballot within 160 days of filing the
petition.34 Qualifying a recall against a state officer requires submitting
signatures equal to 12% of the last vote for the office for a statewideelected officer, and equal to 20% of the last vote for the office for a
district-elected official.35 If a recall qualifies for the ballot, an election
must be held 60 to 80 days from the date of signature certification.36 The
official is removed by majority vote and is succeeded by the candidate
who receives a plurality.37 A separate set of qualifying metrics applies
to local officials.
In the next sections we consider California’s experience with state
and local recalls separately. State official recalls are directed at the
governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, treasurer, controller,
in favor (178, 115-53, 755). Id. This same election saw the adoption of the initiative and
referendum along with women’s suffrage. Id.
29. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1; see Glen Gendzel, The People Versus the Octopus:
California Progressives and the Origins of Direct Democracy, 37 SIÈCLES 1, 3-4 (2013).
30. Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, Living with Direct Democracy: The California Supreme
Court and the Initiative Power—100 Years of Accommodation, 7 CAL. LEGAL HIST. 143, 147
(2012).
31. Compare CHARLES A. BEARD & BIRL E. SHULTZ, DOCUMENTS ON THE STATE-WIDE
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 264-70 (1912) (recall system adopted in 1911 as
CAL. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1), with CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 13-19 (current recall system).
32. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13.
33. Id. § 14(a).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 14(b).
36. Id. § 15(a).
37. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15(c).
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attorney general, superintendent of public instruction, insurance
commissioner, members of the State Board of Equalization, legislators,
and justices of the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court.38
Local recalls are directed at elected officials of a general law or charter
city or county, districts (school, community college, or special), and
Superior Court judges.39
III. CALIFORNIA STATE OFFICIAL RECALLS
A. The procedure
The state officer recall procedure is described in California
Constitution article I and Elections Code Division 11 chapters 1 and 2.
There are five basic steps:
1. Proponents serve, file, and publish a notice of intention to
circulate a recall petition. Although a notice of intention must
contain a statement (under two hundred words long) of the
reasons for the recall, that requirement has no practical effect
because “sufficiency of reason is not reviewable.”40 The notice
must be signed by either 10 proponents or a number of
signatures equal to that required to file the targeted official’s
nomination papers, whichever is greater.41 The notice of
intention is filed with the secretary of state and published in at
least one newspaper of general circulation.42 The targeted
official may file an answer with the secretary of state within 7
days.43
2. The secretary of state must approve the petition’s form and may
reject the petition for discrepancies between it and the notice of
intention.44 If the petition is rejected the proponents have 10

38. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, PROCEDURES FOR RECALLING STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS
1 (2020), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/recalls/recall-procedures-guide.pdf [hereinafter
PROCEDURES FOR RECALLING STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS]; CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 11001,
11006 (Deering 2021).
39. ELEC. §§ 11001, 11004. Superior Court judges are local officials for some purposes
and state officers for others; the Elections Code treats them as local officials for recall
purposes and so do we.
40. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(a); ELEC. § 11020(b); PROCEDURES FOR RECALLING STATE
AND LOCAL OFFICIALS, supra note 38, at 3.
41. ELEC. §§ 11020(c), 11041(a)(2).
42. Id. §§ 11021, 11022.
43. Id. § 11023(a). If the governor or secretary of state is targeted, the recall duties of
that office are performed by the lieutenant governor or controller, respectively. CAL. CONST.
art. II, § 17.
44. See ELEC. § 11042(c).
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days to correct it.45 The process is repeated until no alterations
are required.46
3. Proponents have 160 days from the petition being approved to
circulate it and gather signatures.47 Petition signers must be
qualified to vote for the office of the targeted official.48 Signers
must include their name, signature, and residence address.49
Circulators must submit a declaration that they both witnessed
the signatures being written and believe that each signature is
genuine.50 Voters may withdraw their signatures from the recall
petition up to 30 business days after the secretary of state
announces that a sufficient number of signatures has been
reached.51
4. Election officials verify whether the signature threshold has been
met. Before the 160th day, proponents file the petition and
accompanying signatures with the secretary of state and with
elections officials of each county in which it was circulated.52
For a statewide official, the number of registered voter
signatures accompanying the petition must be 12% of voter
turnout during the last vote for that office.53 For district-elected
officials the signatures must be 20% of the last vote for that
office.54 Signatures for statewide officer recall petitions must
also be obtained in at least 5 different counties and be equal to
at least 1% of the last vote for that office in each of 5 counties.55
5. If the required number of valid signatures is met, an election is
held to determine whether to recall an official and, if
appropriate, to elect a successor.56 Upon determining that
enough valid signatures exist the secretary of state notifies the
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14.
48. ELEC. § 11045.
49. Id. §§ 100, 11043(a). See generally Assembly of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939
(Cal. 1982) (finding that recall petition forms must direct signers to include their “residence
address” rather than “address as registered” or other address).
50. ELEC. §§ 104, 11046.
51. Id. § 11108(b).
52. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(a); see ELEC. §§ 11102, 11103.
53. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b). For example, 12,464,235 votes were cast for governor
in 2018, so the Newsom recall petition required at least 1,495,709 signatures to qualify for the
ballot. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, RECALL OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM FINAL REPORT
(2021),
https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/recalls/recall-final-withdrawn-signatures.pdf
[hereinafter RECALL OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM].
54. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b); ELEC. § 11221(c).
55. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b); ELEC. § 11221(c).
56. See ELEC. §§ 11104, 11107, 11109, 11110, 11227.
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Department of Finance of the results.57 That department then
estimates the recall election’s cost.58 The election must be
within 60 to 80 days from the certification, unless it can be
consolidated with a regular election within 180 days.59 Recall
elections are decided by a simple majority (50%+1).60 The state
will reimburse officials who are not recalled for their costs and
another recall may not be initiated against that official for at least
6 months.61
B. Quantitative analysis
Recalls have been attempted against every branch of California
state government, but nearly all failed either in the signature phase or at
the ballot.62 Of the 179 state officer recalls attempted since 1911 only
11 qualified for the ballot, and just 6 succeeded.63 That’s a 6%
qualifying rate for all attempts, an overall success rate of 3.4%, and
54.5% success for qualified recalls. This shows that state official recalls
are often attempted but rarely qualify. When they do qualify, recalls are
more likely than not to succeed. Our analysis shows that any given recall
petition has only a small chance of making the ballot, which counters
claims that the recall is overused. And despite the outsize attention paid
to California’s two gubernatorial recalls, those contests are outliers when
considered in the broader context of all California state official recalls.
Figure 1 shows that in general recall attempts are periodic rather
than linearly increasing or decreasing, suggesting that the recall is more
popular in some periods than in others. This pattern also supports the
view that the recall is being used more frequently now than in other
periods, because both the qualifying and the success rates are higher in
recent years. More state official recalls qualified in the past 28 years

57. Id. § 11108(c), (d).
58. Id. § 11108(d).
59. The recall election may only be consolidated with the next regularly scheduled
election within 180 days of the date of signature certification if the regularly scheduled
election is occurring wholly or partially within the same jurisdiction in which the recall
election is held, and the number of voters eligible to vote at that next regularly scheduled
election equal to at least 50% of all the voters eligible to vote at the recall election. CAL.
CONST. art. II, § 15(a), (b).
60. ELEC. § 11383.
61. CAL. CONST. art. II § 18.
62. As used here, an attempt is filing a recall petition to start a signature drive; qualifying
means gathering enough signatures to make the ballot; succeeding means the voters removed
the official.
63. Recall History in California (1913 to Present), CAL. SECRETARY ST.,
https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/recalls/recall-history-california-1913-present (last visited
Mar. 30, 2022).
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than in the previous decades. Although 114 recalls were attempted
between 1914 and 1993, none qualified for the ballot. By contrast, of the
61 petitions filed since 1993, only 8 qualified—that’s a 13%
qualification rate. The total recall qualification rate since 1911 is 6.15%,
but that rate nearly doubles for recalls after 1993.
1. The legislature
As Figures 3 and 4 show, more recalls have been filed against
legislators than any other state official, and more of these recalls have
qualified for the ballot. Of the 179 state official recall petitions since
1911, 80 (45%) targeted state legislators—specifically, 50 Assembly
members and 30 state senators.64 Of the 11 recall attempts that qualified
for the ballot since 1911, 9 (81.8%) targeted legislators.65 Other than the
2003 Governor Gray Davis recall, every recalled state official has been
a legislator: in California’s 6 successful recalls, 5 removed legislators (3
senators and 2 Assembly members).66 Compared with the overall recall
success rate of about 3.4%, the overall success rate of recalling
legislators (5 of 80) is nearly double at 6.25%. From this we conclude
that the recall is most often used, and most successfully used, against
legislators compared with any other state official.
2. Gubernatorial recalls
Governors received the second-most recall petitions after the
legislature. Of the 179 state official recall petitions since 1911, 55
(30.7%) were filed against governors.67 Table 1 shows that gubernatorial
recall petitions have been equal opportunity, filed against Democratic
and Republican governors in the past century.68 As with judicial recalls
(discussed next), gubernatorial recall efforts had a slow start. The first
recall petition against a governor was filed in 1939 against Governor
Culbert Olson; he received 5 recall petitions (none qualified).69 Starting
with Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown in 1959, recall petitions have

64. Id.
65. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
66. Recall History in California (1913 to Present), supra note 63.
67. Id.
68. See Zachary J. Siegel, Recall Me Maybe? The Corrosive Effect of Recall Elections
on State Legislative Politics, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 316-17 (2015) (“After they are
initiated, political recalls polarize state and local politics, but it is important to note that the
tactic itself is ideologically neutral. On the whole, liberals attempt to recall conservative
politicians about as often as conservatives attempt to recall liberals. . . . The use of political
recall to oust members of both political parties should therefore concern legislators on both
sides of the aisle.” (footnotes omitted)).
69. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
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been filed almost annually against every sitting governor (Figure 5).70
Ten of the 18 governors since 1911 received recall petitions, and every
governor since 1960 received at least 3 recall petitions (Table 1). Both
Republican and Democratic governors received recall petitions, but only
recalls against Democratic governors qualified (twice).71 Nine of
California’s last 11 governors faced multiple recall attempts (Table 1).
Only 2 gubernatorial recall attempts have qualified: one against
Governor Gray Davis in 2003 (it succeeded) and the other in 2021
against Governor Gavin Newsom (it lost).72
3. Recalling justices
The California Supreme Court has been targeted in several recall
attempts. Just 28 of the 179 total statewide officer petitions (15.6%)
were filed against a justice, and all targeted California Supreme Court
members rather than justices of the Court of Appeal.73 The first attempt
was a petition filed against the entire court in 1966.74 Since then
petitions have targeted individual justices. Of the 14 chief justices since
1911, only 4 received recall petitions: Traynor, Bird, Lucas, and George.
Most attempts against the court’s justices occurred in one decade: all but
2 of the 28 petitions filed against the court’s justices were filed in the
1980s.75 From 1981 to 1986, 9 petitions were filed against Chief Justice
Rose Bird and 17 against other justices.76 Six more were filed in 1987
and 3 more in 1988.77 Since 1988 there has been just 1 petition, against
Chief Justice Ronald George in 1997.78 No recall petition against a
California appellate justice has ever qualified for the ballot.

70. Id.; see also infra fig.5.
71. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
72. Id.; see Recall History in California (1913 to Present), supra note 63.
73. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1; David A. Carrillo, Joshua
Spivak & Brandon V. Stracener, California’s Electorate Runs the Game In Recall Elections,
HARV. ADVANCED LEADERSHIP INITIATIVE SOC. IMPACT REV. (Sept. 8, 2021),
https://www.sir.advancedleadership.harvard.edu/articles/californias-electorate-runs-thegame-in-recall-elections.
74. Cal. Constitution Ctr., What Does California’s Experience with Recall of Judges
Teach Us?, SCOCABLOG (Nov. 10, 2016), http://scocablog.com/what-does-californiasexperience-with-recall-of-judges-teach-us/#_ftnref25.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Rose Bird, Cruz Reynoso, and Joseph Grodin were voted out of office in a
mandatory retention election. Some reports erroneously called the retention race a recall. See
John Balzar, Few Rules to Go By: Justice Bird’s Recall Becoming Epic Battle, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 7, 1985, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-04-07-mn-27518story.html. It is more correct to say that they were not retained.
78. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
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4. Other executive branch officials
Recalls against executive branch officials besides the governor are
less common than those targeting governors: there are only 16 such
petitions (8.9%) since 1911.79 Although gubernatorial recall attempts
started in 1939 and have regularly recurred since 1960, the first petition
against another executive officer was not filed until 1986 against
Lieutenant Governor Leo McCarthy.80 The next year, two petitions were
filed against Attorney General John Van de Kamp.81 Several petitions
between 1995 and 2012 targeted Board of Equalization member Dean
Andal (1995), Insurance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush (2000),
and Attorneys General Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown (2009) and Kamala
Harris (2012).82 In 2019, recalls were filed against the lieutenant
governor, attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, insurance
commissioner, and controller.83 And in 2020 another petition targeted
Attorney General Xavier Becerra.84
Recall efforts against other executive branch officials are too few
and too recent to permit meaningful conclusions. They are less common
than gubernatorial recalls and have generated little public attention. We
suspect that the two gubernatorial recalls received outsized attention
because they targeted the most high-profile state official, not because
those two specific recalls were evidence of some larger pattern in the
recall itself. From this review we conclude that individual legislators
have the most to fear from the recall compared with other state officials.
Overexamined as they are, the two gubernatorial recalls are not
representative of the larger state official recall field.
C. The qualified recalls show the power of interests
In this section we evaluate all qualified state-level recalls
(successful or not) to highlight two themes: how often political interest
groups attempted recalls to serve their own ends, and how often those
attempts failed or backfired. Most state recall attempts have broadly
partisan motivations: they are driven by interest groups to punish
political opponents, or by political parties to drive their agendas.85 Yet
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
85. Siegel, supra note 68, at 334 (“[T]he power of well-financed special interest groups
often dominates the recall process.”). On the state level, we frequently see an interest group
start a recall with a political veneer. The best example of this is the 2012 Wisconsin
gubernatorial recall, which was started by labor groups, but who later lost control to more
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as the individual campaigns and overall arc described below
demonstrate, those partisans generally fail. The recall has not been
effective as a partisan weapon—instead, it is most successful at
validating existing public policy.
Recalls are generally weapons of the weak, used by those out-ofpower to target those in-power.86 Occasionally, they have been used for
partisan purposes. In four cases nationwide, the recall resulted in a state
legislative body switching control from one party to the other.87 But the
infrequency of state-level recalls shows that it is a poor tool for that
approach. The 2011–2012 recalls in Wisconsin (the only attempt to
simultaneously recall large numbers of officials) were a failed endeavor
for Democrats: although the party managed to win the recall elections in
three total senate seats over the two years, they were unable to gain
control of either the governor’s office or the state senate (except for a
brief time at the end of 2012) and failed to achieve any policy changes.
Starting in 2019, Colorado Republicans began targeted campaigns
against Democrats to regain power in a state that has been slipping from
their grasp.88 All these recalls failed to qualify.89 Rather than improving
Republican fortunes, the next election in 2020 saw Colorado Democrats
achieve a double-digit victory margin for the first time in over 50 years.90
The failed recalls against Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker and
California Governor Gavin Newsom are evidence that using the recall
for partisan purposes is unlikely to achieve a satisfying outcome.
1. The first recalls: 1913–1914
The earliest California recalls were filed shortly after the recall was
added to the California Constitution. Five recalls were filed between

established Democratic Party advocates. See JASON STEIN & PATRICK MARLEY, MORE THAN
THEY BARGAINED FOR: SCOTT WALKER, UNIONS AND THE FIGHT FOR WISCONSIN, at xix
(2013).
86. In some instances, the recall is used by officials in power to gain more power, such
as the Senator Denham recall discussed below, but generally that is not the case.
87. SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 40-62, describing each recall contest in detail. The tallies
are original sums of those contests, from data collected by and on file with the authors. The
four cases are Michigan’s Senate in 1983, California Assembly in 1995, Wisconsin Senate in
1996, and the Wisconsin Senate in 2012.
88. See Ken Buck’s “Spell R-E-C-A-L-L” Speech Bites Back Hard, COLO. POLS (Sept.
16, 2019, 1:07 PM), https://www.coloradopols.com/diary/128160/ken-bucks-spell-r-e-c-a-ll-speech-bites-back-hard.
89. See Megan Verlee, After Facing Numerous Recall Attempts, Democratic Lawmakers
Want to Change Rules, CPR NEWS (May 6, 2021, 11:30 AM), https://www.cpr.org/2021/
05/06/after-facing-numerous-recall-attempts-democratic-lawmakers-want-to-change-rules/.
90. Colorado, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/states/Colorado (last visited on
Apr. 6, 2022).
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1913 and 1916, all against legislators.91 Three qualified for the ballot
and two succeeded.92 These first recalls are each standard-setting
examples for how several recall variations have played out since 1911.
One is the rare recall targeting actual criminal conduct. Another is the
interest group recall, which is often attempted but rarely succeeds. The
third is the partisan revenge ploy in which partisans wield the recall
against their political enemies, with some success.
Senator Marshall Black was recalled in 1913.93 This was a unique
event from several perspectives: it was the first recall in California
history, Black is the only state officer recalled for wrongdoing, and this
appears to be the only state official recall to qualify for the ballot without
the aid of interest groups. In 1912 Black was indicted, pleaded guilty,
and sentenced to 10 years in prison for embezzling bank funds.94 This
initial recall success is the archetype of using the recall against corrupt
politicians. As the following examples show, this recall category proved
to be a rare occurrence.
A recall attempt against Senator James Owens failed in 1913.95
This second recall attempt is an archetype of how interest groups try and
fail to use the recall for political ends. Labor groups targeted Owens,
claiming that he failed to fulfill his campaign promises.96 Owens
survived the recall, which backfired on the labor movement by revealing
its political weakness.97 This interest group recall category, as the other
examples below show, is often attempted but rarely succeeds.
Senator Edwin Grant was recalled in 1914.98 This third recall
attempt is an archetype of a political recall: using the recall for revenge
or to challenge the results of a close election. Democrat Grant narrowly
defeated incumbent conservative Republican Senator Eddie Wolfe by 95
votes in 1912. Despite being in the same party, Wolfe was a leader of
the forces opposing Governor Johnson.99 A first recall attempt against
Grant failed to qualify in 1913; a second attempt qualified in 1914.100
Both campaigns were led by the conservative political machine in San
Francisco.101 Contemporary reports note that Grant’s sponsorship of the

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
See BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 271-72.
See id. at 272-74.
See id.
See id.
COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
See Convention Characteristics, CAL. OUTLOOK, Oct. 3, 1914, at 12.
See BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 277-79.
See HICHBORN, supra note 19, at 67-69, 80.
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Redlight Abatement Act was a precipitating event, yet it was not cited
by recall proponents because “to recall a state senator for having opposed
vice conditions did not seem possible even in San Francisco.”102 This
recall was a naked effort to undo the previous election, and it succeeded:
Grant was recalled and Wolfe was elected to replace him.103 As the
following recall examples show, the political revenge recall category
shows mixed results: some successes, some failures. After these three
events, the recall hibernated for about 80 years. Over 110 recalls were
filed against state-level officials between 1916 and 1993, but none
qualified for the ballot.104
2. The post-1993 recalls
Senator David Roberti beat a recall in 1994.105 This campaign
shows how difficult it can be for an interest group to use the recall
offensively. Roberti was the California Senate president pro tem and in
1994 he was termed out and was running for treasurer.106 The gun lobby
targeted Roberti for his role in passing a semiautomatic assault weapons
ban in 1989.107 Roberti defeated the recall effort with 59%, but it did
weaken him by costing his campaign $700,000 and he argued that it hurt
his losing primary campaign for treasurer.108 As the remaining recall
stories and the quantitative analysis below show, even partially
successful results like this are uncommon.
Assembly members Paul Horcher and Doris Allen are in the
partisan revenge category—from their own party. In the 1994 election,
the Republicans captured a bare 41–39 majority in the Assembly.109
Republican Horcher broke from his party and declared himself an
independent, handing the Assembly majority and speaker gavel to long-

102. BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 276; Joshua Spivak, California’s Recall, 82 CAL.
HIST. 20, 29 n.79 (2004).
103. With over 50% of the district voting in the election, Grant was removed by a margin
of 531 votes. See BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 278-79.
104. Data for Figure 1, subsequent charts, and recall statistics provided by COMPLETE
LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
105. Id.
106. SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 42.
107. William Hamilton, Gun Control Stance Makes California Legislator Target of
Recall, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
1994/04/10/gun-control-stance-makes-california-legislator-target-of-recall/0555716a-42494bc2-a974-8e7f7cfa6c91/.
108. Treasurer, CAL. J. WKLY, Nov. 21, 1994, at 13. For an argument that the recall
benefitted Roberti, see Edward Epstein, Recall Victory Gives Roberti an Edge in Treasurer’s
Race, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 14, 1994, at A20.
109. See Jon Matthews, Republican Says He’ll Seize Assembly Post From Brown,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 11, 1994, at A1.
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time Democratic Speaker Willie Brown.110 As political payback,
Republicans qualified a recall against Horcher, which succeeded.111
Following this successful recall, Allen (who blamed her fellow
Republicans for her loss in a 1995 special election) also flipped.112 She
cooperated with Democrats, who voted her in as Assembly speaker.113
Republicans qualified a recall against her, which succeeded, and finally
allowed the Republicans to gain control of the Assembly.114 Although
these may seem like successful recalls, both were short-term victories.
Republicans suffered in the long term: they lost their majority in the next
election in 1996 and have not regained it since, and Republican aides
were indicted for misuse of offices in the Horcher and Allen recalls.115
These recalls show that partisan revenge ploys can be Pyrrhic victories.
Assemblyman Michael Machado defeated a recall in 1995 in
another example of a political party trying to gain a partisan advantage
with a recall by relitigating a close election.116 The Machado recall was
part of the speakership battles that resulted in the Horcher and Allen
recalls.117 After a Republican (Horcher) switched allegiances and voted
for a Democrat for speaker, Republicans targeted both Horcher and
Machado.118 Republicans launched a recall drive claiming that Machado
misled voters by promising to be an independent voice during the
campaign but then voted for Brown (a Democrat) for speaker.119 Unlike
in the general election, Machado easily triumphed in the recall vote.120
The candidate who finished first for the replacement question was the
same Republican Machado beat for the seat, which shows that the real

110. See Susan F. Rasky, In California, Political Prestidigitation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1995, § 4, at 4, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/08/weekinreview/the-nation-in-californiapolitical-prestidigitation.html.
111. Greg Lucas, GOP Backed Recall Succeeds — Horcher Thrown Out/ Vote could affect
S.F. Mayoral race, SFGATE (May 18, 1995, 4:00), https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/
GOP-Backed-Recall-Succeeds-Horcher-Thrown-Out-3032493.php.
112. See B. Drummond Ayres Jr., California Speaker Frustrates G.O.P. One Last Time,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1995, § A, at 14, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/06/us/californiaspeaker-frustrates-gop-one-last-time.html; see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 72.
113. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 72.
114. Id. at 72-73.
115. Id.
116. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
117. See Assemblyman Defeats GOP Recall Attempt, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 23, 1995, 4:00),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Assemblyman-Defeats-GOP-Recall-Attempt3026691.php.
118. Steven A. Capps, GOP’s backing of Assembly recall efforts questioned, CTINSIDER
(May 22, 1995, 4:00), https://www.ctinsider.com/news/article/GOP-s-backing-of-Assemblyrecall-efforts-3145344.php.
119. See id.
120. Assemblyman Defeats GOP Recall Attempt, supra note 117.
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motivation was to overturn the previous election for a very specific
purpose (regaining the speakership and control of the Assembly).121
The 2007 Senator Jeffrey Denham recall attempt was another
partisan effort that backfired. Democrats wanted to remove him to secure
a veto-proof legislative majority.122 The recall qualified, but Denham
defeated it and was elected to Congress in 2010.123 This recall both
failed to achieve its chief aim of securing legislative control and likely
raised the target’s political profile and enabled him to win a higher seat.
The 2018 Senator Josh Newman recall is another example of a
political party using the recall to relitigate a close election. Newman’s
recall is the inverse of the 2007 attempt against Denham: Democrats
needed to remove Republican Denham to secure a legislative
supermajority, and Republicans needed to remove Newman to prevent a
Democratic legislative supermajority.124 Newman was recalled and
replaced by Ling Ling Chang, the candidate Newman had defeated for
the seat in 2016.125 Newman roared back and took the seat from Chang
in 2020.126 This again shows the mixed results of partisan recalls: the
Republican victory was short-lived.
The Governor Gray Davis recall in 2003 is an anomaly. It was both
the first statewide-elected official recall ever to qualify for the ballot and
the only one ever to succeed.127 Recalls are frequently filed against
California governors of both parties; all but two failed to qualify.128
Davis suffered from a variety of problems, including rolling power
outages and high electricity bills from an energy crisis precipitated by a
deregulated market, and an economic recession.129 A combination of a
low signature threshold and major financial backing put the Davis recall

121. SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 44.
122. Id. at 60.
123. Id.
124. Nick Gerda, Josh Newman is Recalled, Ending Democrats’ Supermajority in State
Senate, VOICE O.C. (June 7, 2018), https://voiceofoc.org/2018/06/josh-newman-is-recalledending-democrats-supermajority-in-state-senate/.
125. Id.; see also SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 62.
126. William D’Urso, Chang Concedes to Newman in District 29 Race in SoCal,
SPECTRUM NEWS 1 (Nov. 13, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://spectrumnews1.com/ca/lawest/politics/2020/11/13/chang-concedes-to-newman-in-district-29-race.
127. See COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
128. Id. Seven recalls were filed against Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, 5 against
Governor Jerry Brown during his second stint in the governor’s mansion, 6 against Governor
Gavin Newsom (5 did not qualify, 1 qualified but failed). Since the 2003 Davis recall, 17 of
18 gubernatorial recalls failed to qualify. Id.
129. GERSTON & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 26, at 17, 20.
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on the ballot.130 The 2002 Davis gubernatorial election saw the lowestever voter turnout by percentage in California history, resulting in a
qualification bar of only 897,158 signatures—proportionally the lowest
ever.131 And Republican Darrell Issa gave nearly $2 million to gather
signatures, which was key to qualifying the recall.132
This shows that the Davis recall was a perfect political storm,
combining a unique political landscape where an unpopular governor
confronted a uniquely low signature threshold and a well-funded
antagonist. That matrix resulted in the only removal of an executive
branch official in California state history. These combined extreme
circumstances of the only successful gubernatorial recall in California,
coupled with the many failed efforts, suggest that a unique confluence
of extraordinary factors may be necessary. And as the 2021 Newsom
recall shows, even a confluence of black swan events does not guarantee
recall success. This may explain why, despite the comparative ease of
qualifying a recall in California, we do not see high qualification rates in
general, and why only 2 of 55 (3.6%) gubernatorial recall petitions
qualified.133
The failed 2021 recall attempt against Governor Gavin Newsom
shares a factual context with the successful 2003 Davis recall: both arose
in unique circumstances.
Davis confronted an unprecedented
confluence of energy-and-economic crises; Newsom confronted an
equally extraordinary pandemic.134 Both recall proponents capitalized
on unusual qualifying metrics: the Davis signature requirement was
unusually low, and the Newsom proponents received extra signature
gathering time.135 Yet those broadly similar factual premises led to
divergent results. From a macro perspective these recalls were a policy
130. Reid Wilson, ‘If this thing qualifies, I’m toast’: An oral history of the Gray Davis
recall in California, HILL (Jun. 2, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/
556014-if-this-thing-qualifies-im-toast-an-oral-history-of-the-gray-davis-recall/.
131. GERSTON & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 26, at 50; PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. RES. BRIEF,
VOTERS’ VIEWS OF POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA: DISSATISFACTION, DISTRUST, AND
WITHDRAWAL (2004), https://escholarship.org/content/qt1xs4n3sf/qt1xs4n3sf_noSplash_
3d33d65e24c116583273e16e28bcae96.pdf?t=q0wxfd.
132. SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 46; GERSTON & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 26, at 56-57.
133. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
134. Shawn Hubler & Jennifer Medina, How Gavin Newsom Landed in a California Jam,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/27/us/politics/gavinnewsom-recall-california.html; see Ryan Matsumoto, Higher Approval, a New Electorate and
No Arnold. This Isn’t 2003, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/09/13/upshot/california-recall-election-newsom.html.
135. David A. Carrillo, Joshua Spivak, and Brandon V. Stracener, California’s Electorate
Runs the Game In Recall Elections, HARV. SOC. IMPACT REV. (Sep. 8, 2021),
https://www.sir.advancedleadership.harvard.edu/articles/californias-electorate-runs-thegame-in-recall-elections; Hubler & Medina, supra note 134.
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validating mechanism in which the voters rejected Davis’s energy
policies and endorsed Newsom’s pandemic policies. At the times of
their respective recall elections, Newsom’s approval rating was 53%;
Davis’s was 24%.136 Nor did Newsom face a star-power opponent, as
Davis did with Arnold Schwarzenegger. In 2003, Schwarzenegger was
popular with voters and campaigned on politically moderate positions.137
Governor Newsom instead was able to paint his leading opponent, Larry
Elder, as a far-right conservative with radical views.138 These factors
explain why Governor Newsom defeated his recall with 62%, but Davis
lost his by 55%.139 Both Newsom and Davis saw the result closely
mirror their past elections. Newsom won office in 2018 with the same
61.9% of the vote.140 Davis won in 2002 with 47.4%.141 The same
recall-tracking-election-results factor also appears in the gubernatorial
recalls in Wisconsin in 2012 (less than 1% difference)142 and in North
Dakota in 1921 (2% difference).143
Thus, both the Davis and Newsom recall campaigns are outliers,
but in different directions. Both show that a unique confluence of factors
is necessary to qualify or succeed with a state officer recall. Absent that
confluence, the difficulty and cost of signature gathering will bar
qualification. The Davis recall proponents benefitted from a low
signature gathering threshold and major financial backing; had the
required number been near its usual level that recall probably would have
failed to qualify. The Newsom proponents similarly had major financial
backing and benefitted from an extra 120 days to gather signatures;
absent that their drive also likely would have fallen short.144 In both
136. GERSTON & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 26, at 47; see Matsumoto, supra note 134.
137. See Mark Landy, Schwarzenegger, the Radical Moderate, WASH. POST (Aug. 27,
2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/08/27/schwarzenegger-theradical-moderate/ad865a7f-1a4c-463f-9e63-9a0482257ca2/; David Schecter, California’s
Right of Removal: Recall Politics in the Modern Era, 12 CAL. POL. & POL’Y, no. 1, 2008, at
1; see also Matsumoto, supra note 134.
138. See Maeve Reston, California Gov. Gavin Newsom was facing a right race. Then
Larry Elder came along, CNN (Sept. 14, 2021, 5:23 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/14/
politics/larry-elder-covid-newsom-recall/index.html.
139. SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 47; Shawn Hubler, Newsom Survives California Recall
Vote
and
Will
Remain
Governor,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
14,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/14/us/newsom-governor-california-recall.html.
140. SEC’Y OF STATE ALEX PADILLA, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 6, 2018
GENERAL ELECTION 1 (2018), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2018-general/sov/2018complete-sov.pdf.
141. SEC’Y OF STATE BILL JONES, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 5, 2002 GENERAL
ELECTION, at iii (2002), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2002-general/sov-complete.pdf.
142. SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 55.
143. Id. at 57-58.
144. Lara Korte, ‘Lost in the shuffle.’ Did Democrats miss a chance to block a Newsom
recall election?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 15, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/
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cases, qualifying for the ballot depended on extraordinary
circumstances.
The successful Davis recall shows how voter
disapproval of a governor’s response to a crisis can be fatal. The failed
Newsom recall shows how voter approval of a governor’s emergency
response can overcome a seemingly mortal threat.
D. California state official recalls are consistent with national data
1. Procedures compared
Nineteen other states and the District of Columbia have recall
procedures for removing state officials.145 State recall laws vary greatly
across the country. The distinctions can be substantive or procedural:
 Is there a legal reason needed for the recall?
 How many signatures need to be gathered?
 Who can sign?
 How much time is allowed to collect the signatures?
Eleven states are, like California, political recall states: the recall
can be launched for any reason.146 The other 8 recall states require a
statutorily described reason.147 In these malfeasance standard states, a
judge or an election official can quash the recall for not meeting the
requirements, such as violations of the “oath of office,” “failure to
perform duties prescribed by law,” “Conviction for a Felony,”
“Corruption,” “Incompetence in office,” or “Malfeasance in office.”148

news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article249843718.html. See generally Carrillo, Spivak
& Stracener, supra note 73.
145. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wisconsin. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 21; see also Recall of State
Officials, supra note 3.
146. These are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin. ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1 & 2; see
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 61 (California); COLO. CONST. art. XXI; IDAHO CONST. art.
VI, § 6; IDAHO CODE § 34-1703 (2021); LA. CONST. art X, § 26; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 8;
NEV. CONST. art. II, § 9; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); N.D. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 & 10; OR.
CONST. art. 2, § 18; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 12; see also Joshua Spivak, Recall Elections in
the US: Its Long Past and Uncertain Future, in THE POLITICS OF RECALL ELECTIONS 73, 7576 (Yanina Welp & Laurence Whitehead eds., 2020) [hereinafter Spivak, Recall Elections in
the US].
147. A recent Alaska Supreme Court decision has arguably pushed them into the political
recall state category. See State v. Recall Dunleavy, 491 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2021).
148. These are Alaska, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode Island (which
exempts the legislature), and Washington. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 8; GA. CODE ANN. §§
21-4-1 to 21-4-21 (2021); KAN. CODE § 25-4302; MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 6; MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-16-601 to 2-16-635 (2021); R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 3334. Illinois, which only allows recalls for the Governor, does not list specific reasons, but
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Nearly all state official recalls have occurred in political recall states.
The only state official to ever face a recall vote in a malfeasance standard
state was a state senator in Washington in 1981.149
California has arguably the least burdensome procedure for
recalling statewide officials.150 Proponents need to gather signatures
equal to 12% of the vote cast in the last election within 160 days.151 The
signature laws in recall states have various metrics for the required mark.
As Table 5 shows, it may be based on eligible voters, registered voters,
or a percentage of turnout at the last election. Comparing these various
signature requirements is difficult because the populations vary.
Assuming identical population percentages and qualifying percentages,
measuring by eligible voters produces the highest number, followed by
registered voters, and with turnout giving the lowest qualifying number.
Using those assumptions, California has the lowest real signature
requirement.152
 Kansas requires 40% of turnout in the last election.153
 New Jersey requires 25% of registered voters.154
 Nine states require signatures equal to 25% of turnout.155
 Idaho and Louisiana require 20% of eligible voters.156
 Georgia requires 15% of eligible voters.157
 Oregon and Rhode Island require 15% of turnout.158
 Illinois requires 15% of turnout and the support of a bipartisan
grouping of legislators.159
 California requires 12% of turnout.160

requires that a bipartisan collection of legislators sign the petition. See ILL. CONST. art. III, §
7; Spivak, Recall Elections in the US, supra note 146, at 75-76.
149. Joshua Spivak, The unique challenge of the Alaska gubernatorial recall,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.adn.com/opinions/2019/08/20/theunique-challenge-of-the-alaska-gubernatorial-recall/.
150. See ANN BOWMAN & RICHARD C. KEARNEY, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 8485 (6th ed. 2014).
151. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(a), (b).
152. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, REFORMING THE RECALL REPORT #266, at 12, 13
tbl.3 (2022).
153. KAN. STAT. § 25-4311 (2021).
154. N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:27A-5 (2013).
155. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.610 (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-201 (2021); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 1-12-104(1) (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 168.951-.955; MINN. CONST. art.
VIII, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. II, § 9; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 2; WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.180
(2021); WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 12(1).
156. IDAHO CODE § 34-1702(2) (2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1300.2(B)(3)(d) (2022).
157. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-4-4(a)(1) (2021).
158. OR. CONST. art II, § 18(2); R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
159. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 7.
160. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b).
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 Montana requires 10% of registered voters.161
 Virginia requires 10% of turnout, but this state may not have a
recall law impacting state officials, or specifically governors. It
also uses a procedure called recall trials, where if enough
signatures are gathered a judge holds a trial rather than an
election. We discount Virginia as an unverifiable outlier.162
Montana’s 10% requirement seems to be easier to reach than
California’s 12% mark. But those are the absolute metrics. California’s
real number is much easier to achieve because Montana requires the
signatures of 10% of registered voters, while California requires 12% of
voter turnout. California’s turnout rule required the 2021 Newsom recall
proponents to gather 1,495,709 signatures;163 if California used
registered voters as Montana does the proponents would have needed
2,215,430 signatures. Montana recalls are more difficult for other
reasons: it is a malfeasance standard state, and its signature collection
timeframe is just 90 days compared with California’s 160 days.164 And
that 160-day signature gathering period is the fifth longest of any state.165
Thus, overall California’s requirements for qualifying a recall petition
are arguably the easiest to meet in practice.166
2. Data compared
Despite the comparative ease of qualifying recall petitions in
California discussed above, in California state official recalls qualify and
succeed at low rates that are comparable to the results in other recall
states. In 179 statewide recall attempts since 1911, only 11 have
qualified for the ballot, and only 6 were successful (54.5%).167 Thus, in
over a century just 6.1% of all California state official recall attempts
qualified for the ballot and only 3.4% of those attempts succeeded.

161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-16-614(2) (2021).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-233 (2021).
163. RECALL OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM, supra note 53.
164. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-16-601 to 2-16-635 (2021); id. § 2-16-614 (addressing
number of electors required for a recall petition); see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 40
tbl.2.2.
165. Alaska has no time limit. ALASKA CONST. art. XI; ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.470–
.720 (2021); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 25.240 (2021); see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note
7, at 40 tbl.2.2. New Jersey grants 320 days when a Governor or United States Senator is
sought to be recalled. N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:27A-10(1) (2021). Washington provides 270 days.
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.150(2) (2021). Louisiana gives 180 days. LA. STAT. ANN. §
18:1300.2(C)(2) (2022).
166. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 152, at 13-14 (discussing the two perceived
issues with California’s recall process).
167. RECALL OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM, supra note 53.
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Of the 179 California state official recall petitions since 1911, 80
(45%) targeted state legislators: 50 Assembly members and 30 state
senators.168 Of the 11 recall attempts that qualified for the ballot since
1911, 9 (81.8%) targeted legislators.169 And other than the 2003
Governor Gray Davis recall, every recalled state official (5 of 6) has been
a legislator.170 The qualification rate for California legislator petitions is
11% (9 of 80). Of the 6 successful recalls in California, 5 succeeded in
removing legislators (3 senators and 2 Assembly members).171
Compared to the overall recall success rate of about 3.4%, the overall
success rate of recalling legislators is nearly double at 6.25% (5 of 80).
The success rate for qualified legislator petitions is 55.6%.
No other state appears to tabulate recall attempts against their statelevel officials. But our analysis shows that recall efforts in other states
(as in California) are vastly more likely to qualify and succeed against
local officials than state officers. And among the few state recalls, also
as in California, attempts against state legislators in other recall states
are more common than against other state officials. In the other states,
30 state legislator recalls qualified for the ballot.172 Seven state-wide
officials faced a recall: 2 governors, 1 lieutenant governor, 1 attorney
general, 1 agriculture and labor commissioner, and 2 public services
commissioners.173 Five of these 7 recalls occurred over a century ago.174
Of the 39 state legislative recalls in United States history, in 21 of those
attempts the legislator was unseated.175 Thus, outside California the
nationwide success rate for qualified legislator petitions is 55%, which
is nearly identical to California’s 55.6% success rate for qualified
petitions against legislators. This shows that, despite having arguably
the easiest qualifying metrics and arguably the largest field of targetable
officials, California is about average in the number of qualified and
successful recalls.176
Gubernatorial recall qualifying and success rates in California are
similar to those in other recall states. Only 2 California recall efforts
168. Recall History in California (1913 to Present), supra note 63; COMPLETE LIST OF
RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
169. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1; Recall History in California
(1913 to Present), supra note 63.
170. Recall History in California (1913 to Present), supra note 63.
171. COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1; Recall History in California
(1913 to Present), supra note 63.
172. SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 40–62, describing each recall contest in detail. The tallies
are original sums of those contests, from data collected by and on file with the authors.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 58-62 (listing all recall results).
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targeting governors (3.6%) have qualified among 55 attempts.177 Five
governor recall petitions have qualified in the United States, and only 2
of these governors were recalled.178 By our rough count, there have been
486 governors since 1900 in the 19 recall states; with just 5 of them (1%)
ever facing a recall, it’s safe to conclude that gubernatorial recalls are
very rare.
There are just a few examples of campaigns to recall judges in
California or in other recall states.179 Twenty-eight petitions were filed
against California justices; none qualified.180 We found evidence of 4
petitions against California judges that qualified; all 4 succeeded.181 The
2018 recall of Santa Clara Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky was a rare
event. Before that no California judge had been recalled since 1932, no
recall petition against a judge had qualified since one in Wisconsin in
1982, and Persky was the first judge recalled nationwide since 1977 in
Wisconsin.182 We found no recalls against a statewide judge in any other
state. The upshot is that recalls against judges, in California and
nationwide, are quite rare.183
Given these low historical qualifying and success rates for recalls
(overall and parsed by position) in California and other recall states, we
conclude that California’s comparatively easy qualifying standard for
state official recalls may encourage recall attempts, but the data show

177. Recall History in California (1913 to Present), supra note 63.
178. See ZIMMERMAN supra note 7, at 60 (noting that by comparison 16 governors have
been impeached). The five qualified governor petitions are: North Dakota Governor Lynn J.
Frazier (1921, succeeded), California Governor Gray Davis (2003, succeeded), Arizona
Governor Evan Mecham (1988, impeached before the recall election), Wisconsin Governor
Scott Walker (2012, defeated), California Governor Gavin Newsom (2021, defeated). Id. at
60-68.
179. See Cal. Constitution Ctr., supra note 74.
180. See COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1.
181. A petition targeting California Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky qualified in 2018
and succeeded at the June 2018 ballot. Maggie Astor, California Voters Remove Judge Aaron
Persky, Who Gave a 6-Month Sentence for Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us/politics/judge-persky-brock-turner-recall.html; see
California Judge Recalled for Sentence in Sexual Assault Case, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1369
(2019). And three Los Angeles judges were targeted simultaneously in 1932; all three were
recalled. See Wilbank J. Roche, Judicial Discipline in California: A Critical Re-Evaluation,
10 LOY. L.A. L. REV 192, 197-98 (1976).
182. See Astor, supra note 181; Joshua Spivak, Kicked out of the Robe: Will Judges be
Targeted with Recall Campaigns?, AM LAW LITIG. DAILY (Apr. 30, 2018, 5:52 PM),
https://www.law.com/litigationdaily/2018/04/30/daily-dicta-kicked-out-of-the-robe-willjudges-be-targeted-with-recall-campaigns/ [hereinafter Spivak, Kicked out of the Robe].
183. See Cal. Constitution Ctr., supra note 74. See generally BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9,
at 49. Taft vetoed the Arizona Constitution over its recall of judges plan. See Special Message
of the President of the United States Returning Without Approval, H.R.J. Res. 14, 62d Cong.
(1911).
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that the qualifying standard neither results in more petitions qualifying,
nor in more recalls succeeding.
IV. CALIFORNIA LOCAL OFFICIAL RECALLS
Our analysis shows that existing local recall qualification
requirements are sufficiently burdensome to prevent abuse and
unnecessary waste of resources. As our analysis in this section shows,
much of the criticism directed at the recall is based on perceptions of the
state recall. By contrast, little quantitative and qualitative research exists
concerning the local recall, yet it is often conflated with state level
recalls. Consequently, the local recall is misunderstood because it is
understudied. Our data analysis in this section shows that the recall has
served its intended purpose at the local level: keeping elected officials
accountable and removing bad actors who no longer command broad
public support. We conclude that the local recall’s bad reputation is
undeserved because it is not grounded in quantitative evidence, and that
the existing recall requirements are generally sufficient to check local
electorate power.
A. The procedure
The local recall process (for county, city, and special district
officials) is largely similar to the state-level process. Local election
officials perform the duties that the secretary of state would for a state
official recall.184 Statutes provide for local official recalls in general law
cities, and charter counties and cities set their own recall procedures by
charter.185 Due to the number and diversity of recall procedures among
charter cities, we exclude them and analyze only general law county and
city recalls.186
There are three main differences between the
requirements for general law local recalls and state official recalls: the
184. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 307 (Deering 2021) (providing the definition of “clerk”); id. §
1100203 (providing the definition of “elections official”); see also id. §§ 11021-23; id. §§
11041-43; id. §§ 11220-27; id. §§ 11240-41 (providing general procedure for initiating a
recall).
185. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 19. Examples of charter cities with their own recall procedures
include San Francisco and Berkeley. Charter of the City and County of San Francisco sec.
14.103; Berkeley Charter art. IV sec. 7.
186. Most California cities have opted to remain general law cities. The state has 482
incorporated cities: 361 are general law and 121 are charter cities. LEAGUE CAL. CITIES,
https://alcl.assembly.ca.gov/sites/alcl.assembly.ca.gov/files/League%20of%20California%2
0Cities.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2022). The same preference is true for counties, which can
also adopt charters under CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a). Of California’s 58 counties, 44 are
general law counties and 14 are charter counties. County Structure & Powers, CAL. ST. ASSN.
COUNTIES, https://www.counties.org/general-information/county-structure-0 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2022).
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timing for when local officials can be recalled, the signature threshold,
and the petition filing deadlines.
Recall proceedings against local officials cannot be commenced if
the official has held office during the current term for less than 90 days,
if the voters rejected a previous recall election against the official within
the last 6 months, or if the official’s term ends in 6 months or less.187 As
Table 2 shows, the signature requirement varies according to the number
of registered voters in the target’s voting district and on the type of office
targeted.188 For example, if a Superior Court judge is targeted
proponents must collect signatures equal to at least 20% of the last
turnout.189 Or if a water district official is targeted the threshold is 10%
of the assessed value of land in the official’s jurisdiction.190 Filing
deadlines for local recall petitions also vary depending on the population
size and number of registered voters in a voting district. A deadline can
range from 40 days after the petition is approved for voting districts with
fewer than 1,000 registered voters, to 160 days for districts with over
50,000 registered voters.191
B. Quantitative analysis
1. Methodology
We compiled California general law local recall data for the 10year period from 2011 to 2021. Assembling a larger dataset for local
California recall elections is prohibitively difficult due to the difficulty
in accessing information on local recall efforts before 2011. Even if this
period is not representative of long-term local recall trends, we can
assume that this decade at least reflects current distinctions between the
state and local recall, and that it accurately represents the current state of
local recalls in California. We analyze the correlations between a recall
effort’s outcome and the targeted official’s office type, gender, voting
district population size, year of the recall, location, and margin-ofvictory or defeat for recalls that resulted in elections. Our analysis
produces several conclusions:
 Recalls are attempted, qualify, and succeed more often at the
local level compared with state official recalls. There are more

187. ELEC. § 11007. These provisions do not apply to local officers appointed in lieu of
an election code pursuant to California Elections Code section 10229. Id. § 10229.
188. Id. § 11221(a).
189. Id. § 11221(c); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b).
190. ELEC. § 11221(d).
191. Id. § 11220.
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local than state officials, so we compared percentages rather
than raw numbers.
 Although recalls are used more at the local than the state level,
both have similarly low qualifying rates: the majority of recall
efforts at both levels fail to qualify.
 When local recall petitions do qualify, they are more likely than
not (61.9%) to succeed. (Compare that with the state level 54.5%
recall success-after-qualifying rate.)
We summarize our findings by comparing them with other states
and find that, nationwide, the recall is primarily a local tool: in all 19
recall states, state officer petitions qualify at lower rates than local
petitions. We also argue that the overall dynamics of recalls reveal them
to be primarily policy-validating tools.
2. Dataset
As with the state recall discussion above, here we distinguish
between a recall petition being filed, qualifying for the ballot, and
success or defeat at the ballot. From 2011 to 2021 there were 600 recall
petitions initiated against local officials in California.192 Table 3
(summary of local recalls) shows that of those 600 petitions, 45 are
currently active as of December 2021: 5 are scheduled for the future and
40 are still gathering signatures. In the other 555 completed (by failure
to qualify or by vote) recall drives, 139 qualified for the ballot. Of the
qualified petitions, 112 officials (20% of petitions, 80.6% of qualified)
left office by some means (either by successful recall vote or by other
means such as resignation). The majority of those who left office were
removed from office through a recall election: 86 succeeded at the ballot
(15.5% of petitions, 61.9% of qualified), 23 officials resigned from
office, and 2 officials were removed by fellow board members before
the recall election. The remaining 416 petitions (75% of all completed
attempts) did not qualify for the ballot.
3. Analysis
Although the vast majority (75%) of local recall petitions do not
qualify for the ballot, a clear majority (61.9%) of those that qualify

192. See infra tbl.3. Supporting data for Table 3 and the analysis in this section are
compiled by and on file with the authors. Supporting data and calculations are also available
online. See Recall data archive, BERKELEY L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/research/
california-constitution-center/publications-and-submissions/recall-data-archive/ (last visited
Sept. 20, 2022).
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succeed in removing the targeted official.193 This success rate could be
even higher because the threat of a recall can cause officials to vacate
their seats before an election. If seats vacated-by-any-means are counted
as successful removals of a targeted official, then the qualified petitions
success rate increases significantly to 79% (Table 3). This supports
several conclusions. Recalls are very difficult to qualify for the ballot,
with just 25% qualifying. But local recalls that qualify are overall very
likely (80.6%) to force the official from office and have an
approximately 60–40 chance of winning the vote. Yet any given recall
petition faces long odds: even including the vacated-by-any-means
figure, just 20% of all petitions in this dataset resulted in a vacated seat.
The high 469:86 attempt-to-ballot-success ratio for completed local
recalls in our dataset may result from the enticing, better-than-even
chances of succeeding. A victory margin is the difference between the
percentage of votes cast in favor and against the recall, and recalls
typically succeed with wide victory margins. For example, with 60% in
favor and 40% against recalling the official, the victory margin is 20%.
Defeat margin here refers to the difference between the percentage of
votes cast against an official’s recall and the percentage of votes cast in
favor of the recall. Figure 8 (victory or defeat margin) shows that on
average, education officials are removed from office by a 41% margin.
The victory margin varied anywhere between 100% for the recall
election of City of Industry Council Member Abraham Cruz in 2020, to
as low as 2% in the recall election of Los Banos School Board member
John Mueller in 2016.194 Elections are, of course, binary result games.
Yet the psychology of a 61.9% chance of thumping a recall target by a
wide victory margin may outweigh the reality of any given recall
petition’s low 20% chance of succeeding.
When local officials survive their recall elections they do so by
much narrower margins. On average, recall elections feature a 21%
margin of defeat, but range from as low as 4% to as high as 60%.195 This
permits three conclusions: local recall elections are not very competitive,
targeted officials whose recalls qualify are generally unpopular, and
193. Supporting data is compiled by and on file with the authors. See Recall data archive,
supra note 192.
194. See Abraham Cruz recall, City of Industry, California (2019-2020), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Abraham_Cruz_recall,_City_of_Industry,_California_(2019-2020)
(last visited Aug. 11, 2022); see also John Mueller recall, Los Banos Unified School District,
California (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/John_Mueller_recall,_Los_Banos_
Unified_School_District,_California_(2016) (last visited Aug. 11, 2022) (showing that
51.85% of voters chose to recall John Mueller while 48.15% of voters chose to retain John
Mueller, leading to a 2% victory margin).
195. See Recall data archive, supra note 192.

2022]

CALIFORNIA’S RECALL IS NOT OVERPOWERED

511

targeted officials who survive their recall elections can be wounded by a
weak mandate to remain in office. The fact that targeted officials often
lack clear mandates may also explain why 16 elected officials were each
targeted for recall twice. Four of those attempts were successful on the
second try at removing the official through election or resignation, and
another official was targeted a second time after beating a first recall by
14%.196 Again, appearances may matter more than the bare result: an
official who survives a recall by a narrow margin may be weakened by
the perception of weak voter support. Thus, recall proponents may score
political benefits even if the target survives. And as the 2021 Newsom
recall demonstrates, that dice roll can break in the target’s favor and
demonstrate political strength by repelling the recall with a wide margin.
Figure 7 (recall attempts by population size) shows that even as the
qualification rate decreases as the size of the voting district population
increases, the removal rate remains high at all population sizes. Here,
qualification rate (Q) is the percentage of all recall attempts that qualify
for the ballot, and removal rate (R) is the percentage of all qualified
attempts that result in either the removal or resignation of the targeted
official. The leave rate (L) is the percent of all petitions that result in a
vacated seat by any means. As Q and R both increase, L increases as the
percentage of all recall attempts that result in the targeted official leaving
office.197 This relationship is expressed through the formula Q x R = L.
If Q and R are both high or are both low, it is difficult to draw
conclusions about recall process requirements. On the one hand, if both
Q and R are high, then recalls are easy to qualify for the ballot and
successful at removing the targeted official. This could indicate local
electorate support in favor of the recall, or potentially an overly lenient
recall process. Recall attempts in voting districts with fewer than 1,000
people represent this relationship. For example, even in districts with
fewer than 1,000 registered voters and a 30% signature requirement,
recall attempts in these small towns qualify 100% of the time and
succeed in removing the targeted official 78% of the time (Figure 7). On
the other hand, if both Q and R are low, then recalls are both difficult to
196. For example, Westminster City Council member Kimberly Ho survived a recall
election for her position in 2020 (43% voted to remove her and 57% voted to keep her in
office). See Mayor and city council recall, Westminster, California (2020), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Mayor_and_city_council_recall,_Westminster,_California_(2020)
(last visited Apr. 1, 2022). She was then the target of another recall attempt which failed to
qualify for the ballot in 2021. See Kimberly Ho and Carlos Manzo recall, Westminster,
California (2021-2022), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Kimberly_Ho_and_Carlos_
Manzo_recall,_Westminster,_California_(2021-2022) (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
197. This count includes officials who left office via election, resignation, or removal by
fellow elected representatives.
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qualify for the ballot and unsuccessful when they do make it to the ballot.
This suggests that either the local electorate disfavors removing elected
officials through a recall, or that the recall requirements may be too
difficult.
From Figure 7 we draw several conclusions. The overall chance of
any given petition ultimately resulting in a vacated seat sits in a narrow
10-point band across all electorate sizes. For instance, a recall petition
has about the same average chance of causing a vacant seat, regardless
how big the voting pool is.198 Viewed in isolation that factor would
suggest that voting pool size does not significantly affect a local recall’s
success or failure at the ballot. But other factors make the picture more
complex. One complicating factor is that Q is inversely related to voting
population size: a low voter pool sees a high qualification rate, and the
qualification rate drops as the voter pool increases. And the success rate
of qualified petitions is also inversely related to the electorate size: the
success rate drops as the electorate size increases. Those two inverse
relationships track with each other: both the qualification rate and the
success rate decline to approximately the same degree as the voting pool
grows.
From that combination of factors, we conclude that the recall’s
power is inversely proportional to population size: the smaller the
electorate the more effective the recall. This probably results from the
relative ease of gathering a smaller real signature number in a smaller
population. Table 7 shows that 97% (542 out of 560 total attempts)
occurred within voting districts with over 1,000 people, where recalls
qualified for the ballot 45% or less of the time, but 75% to 85% of
qualified recalls succeeded.199 Thus, in 97% of local recalls Q is low and
R is high. The fact that most local electorate size ranges experience low
qualification rates and high removal rates suggests that qualifying recalls
is difficult in almost any given local voting pool size (because most pools
have populations over 1,000), and that qualified recalls have a high
chance of removing the official. The signature requirement decreases as
the voting district population increases and Q decreases—effects that
can be attributed to how the real signature number rises with larger
populations.200

198. The average chance varies between a low of 75% and a high of 85%.
199. See infra tbl.7.
200. The link inverse relationship between Q and population size, all else equal, is also
seen at the state level. For example, the Q rate for California gubernatorial recall attempts is
under 4%, versus 20% for state senatorial recall attempts. See Recall data archive, supra note
192 for supporting data and calculations.
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That inverse relationship, combined with the 97% of local
electorates with low Q and high R rates, suggests that recalls in these
districts are already difficult enough to qualify, yet are successful enough
when voters are motivated. This permits conclusions about the
stringency of recall requirements and the appeal of the recall as a direct
democracy tool when Q is high and R is low, or vice versa. If Q is high
and R is low, recall requirements are not very restrictive and recall
elections are not successful at removing the targeted official. That
scenario arguably encourages abusing the recall process, and
consequently wasting taxpayer money and voter time. Yet our analysis
shows that this scenario does not exist at any population size, which
refutes arguments that the local recall is too easy to use.
Instead, the low qualifying rate suggests that the recall is being used
sparingly by local voters, especially in larger voting districts; again, just
3% of the local recalls in the past decade arose in sub-1,000-person
electorates. And the consistently high success rate for qualified recalls
across all population sizes suggests that local voters have the power to
eject an official if the voters are motivated to do so. These conclusions
counter arguments about making the recall harder to use in larger
population sizes (which describes most local electorates) because recalls
already qualify at low rates in those population brackets. The fact that
qualified recalls have such a high success rate suggests that local voters
only qualify recalls when there is a consensus to remove the official.
Making that harder to do arguably would thwart majority will.
We also found that the officials who hold an education-related
office, city council, or other non-mayoral city position are the most likely
recall targets. Table 4 (summary of recall rates, by office type) shows
that officials holding city council and other city positions were the most
targeted by recall efforts (191 attempts). Officials serving on school
boards, as superintendents, or in other education-related positions were
the second-most-targeted group (190 attempts). By contrast, officials in
law and law enforcement positions (such as judges, sheriffs, and city and
district attorneys) were the least likely to be the target of a recall
campaign (15 attempts).201 Although recall campaigns most often target
education and city council related positions, they do not have the highest
Q or R rates. Instead, special district recall attempts have the highest Q
(38%) and the highest R (96%), while education recalls have the second
201. Under the California constitution, charter counties have the power to create their own
recall and removal procedures for sheriffs. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 4. The California
constitution also require that all counties, including charter counties, have a recall process for
the electorate to remove sheriffs, regardless of what other provisions that have for removing
sheriffs through a governing body vote or statutory law. Id.
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highest R (86%). These results may be partly explained by the lower
signature requirement for water districts. Unlike recalls in most voting
districts, recalls in water districts only require the signatures of voters
who own 10% of the assessed value of land within the water district,
which allows just a few wealthy landowners to successfully qualify a
recall petition for the ballot.202 But even accounting for this outlier
signature requirement and removing water districts from the special
districts category, Table 4 shows that special district recall attempts still
qualify at the highest rate (33%) and successfully remove special district
officials 100% of the time.203
This suggests that local electorates are most likely to successfully
use the recall to remove officials concerned with direct services. If there
are issues with the management, price, or delivery of services like water,
firefighting, parks, and healthcare, then the local electorate is more likely
to qualify a petition and succeed at recalling the relevant officials
because these services affect a large number of individuals on a day-today basis.204 For example, in the 2016 Yorba Linda Water District recall
the water district’s significant rate hike so enraged voters that they
initiated a recall against the board members, sued the district, and
submitted a referendum petition to repeal the new rates or put them up
to a vote.205
Parsing victory and defeat margins by office type shows that the
least competitive types of recall elections involve special district and
law-related recalls; conversely, the most competitive recalls involve
county supervisor, city council, and non-mayoral city official recalls.
We measure competitiveness as the difference between the average
margin at which an official is removed, and the average margin at which
a recall attempt fails. Figure 8 (average victory and defeat margin by
office type) shows that, after law and law enforcement recalls, special
district recall elections are on average the least competitive with a 32.3%
202. See generally SHANNON BUSHEY, GUIDE TO RECALL FOR LOCAL OFFICES 15 (rev.
2019),
https://sccvote.sccgov.org/sites/g/files/exjcpb1106/files/County%20Recall%
20Guide.pdf; CAL. ELEC. CODE § 11221(d) (Deering 2021).
203. Note that not all water districts are landowner voting districts.
204. School board district recalls are notoriously contentious. See, e.g., San Francisco
Unified School District recall, California (2021–22), https://ballotpedia.org/San_Francisco_
Unified_School_District_recall,_California_(2021-2022) (last visited Apr. 1, 2022)
(overview of the recall); Joe Eskenazi, The strange and terrible saga of Alison Collins and
her ill-fated tweets, MISSION LOC. (Mar. 23, 2021), https://missionlocal.org/2021/03/alisoncollins-school-board-tweets (detailing racist tweets and allegations made by a school board
member).
205. See Matt Stevens, A cautionary tale for water districts as Yorba Linda’s water rate
battle leads to a recall vote, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016, 5:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-yorba-linda-water-recall-20161107-story.html.
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difference between average victory and defeat margins. Special district
officials who remain in office after a recall election also do so by the
narrowest margin of all office types (8%).
Figure 8 also shows law and law enforcement recalls are on average
the least competitive recall elections (38% difference between victory
and defeat margins), and are the only office type where average voting
margin for successful recall elections (60%) is higher than that for
elections that remove the official (22%).206 This suggests that special
district officials are the most likely to be targeted for a recall, and that
they may have the weakest mandate to remain in office. The fact that
special district officials are elected for one specific task may make them
particularly vulnerable for a recall because there is no other performance
metric for them to rely on for retaining the position.
By contrast, recall elections for city council and non-mayoral city
positions have the lowest difference between average victory and defeat
margins (2.2%), and are closely followed by county supervisor recall
elections (3%). This suggests that recalls against county supervisor and
non-mayoral city officials are the most competitive recall elections. Like
presidential or gubernatorial elections, county supervisor and city
council officials (who make up 96% of officials counted in the nonmayoral city officials category) are often the most visible and publicly
known elected officials in government. This visibility may increase
voter turnout and local electorate support for the targeted official, but
also polarize the local electorate and result in more competitive recall
elections. For example, the 2020 recall targeting Santa Cruz City
Council members Chris Krohn and Drew Glover was the first time a
Santa Cruz recall qualified and removed a council member. Both Chris
Krohn and Drew Glover were removed from office by narrow margins
(2% for Krohn and 6% for Glover).207 Although the recall election was
held with the March 2020 presidential primary, the recall election still

206. See infra fig.8. These data may be outliers however because law and law enforcement
officials have been the target of the fewest number of recall attempts (15). Only 3 of those 15
attempts resulted in an election, and only 1 of those 3 elections was sustained (by a margin of
60%). See Recall data archive, supra note 192 for supporting data and calculations. See also
Jill Ravitch recall, Sonoma County, California (2020-2021), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Jill_Ravitch_recall,_Sonoma_County,_California_(2020-2021) (last
visited Apr. 1, 2022) (noting that the district attorney remained in office after recall election
with 76% of votes cast against the recall).
207. Nicholas Ibarra, History made as Santa Cruz voters recall two City Council members,
SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Mar. 30, 2020; 7:55 PM), https://www.santacruzsentinel.com/
2020/03/30/history-made-as-santa-cruz-voters-recall-two-city-council-members/.
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garnered 64% voter turnout and produced acrimonious debate about the
policies of the two targets.208
There are no obvious trend lines in terms of number of recall
attempts, qualification rate, or removal rate by year over the least 10
years. Excluding the currently active recall attempts, 2012 had the
largest number of local recall attempts of any year (83), but 2015 had the
highest R (95%). Recalls qualified for the ballot most often in 2011
(45% of the time), and the least in 2019 (zero).209 These figures undercut
complaints that the recall is either being overused or that its use has
increased over time. Yet it does not completely refute those claims
because our dataset only covers the most recent decade.
Finally, there is no obvious bias in terms of which gender is recalled
more often. Although 63% of all recall targets were male, this imbalance
is likely explained by the fact that men still continue to hold the majority
of government elected positions in California.210 Once recall petitions
qualify for the ballot, men are removed from office at only a slightly
higher rate (82%) than women (78%), and the proportion of all recall
attempts against men that result in the official leaving office (21%) is
also similar to the corresponding figure for women (19%).211 This
suggests that local recalls are individualized events: local electorate
motivation to initiate and vote for recall petitions targeting local officials
is unrelated to the gender of the targeted official.
C. California local recalls are consistent with national data
Although this dataset only encompasses the last 10 years and
precludes historical trend conclusions about the local level recall, it does
permit a present-day evaluation of the local recall in California and
comparison with recent state-level recalls.
At least 41 states and the District of Columbia have recall
procedures for removing local recall officials.212 Once again, we see that
state level recalls are extremely rare compared to local recalls. In United
208. See id.; CTY OF SANTA CRUZ ELECTION DEP’T, CALIFORNIA PRESIDENTIAL
PRIMARY COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ (2020), https://www.votescount.us/Portals/16/
mar2020/finalresults.htm?ver=2020-04-01-145124-690.
209. See Recall data archive, supra note 192 for supporting data and calculations.
210. Although data on the gender makeup of elected officials at the local level in
California is not readily available, women represent 32% of the California legislature. See
Jennifer Paluch, Where California Stands with Women in the Legislature, PUB. POL’Y INST.
CAL. (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.ppic.org/blog/where-california-stands-with-women-inthe-legislature/.
211. See Recall data archive, supra note 192.
212. Many states simply allow localities to pass recall laws, which results in only a few
localities in the state having such procedures. Note that there is no consensus on this figure.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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States history, just 48 state level recalls qualified—compared with
approximately 7,000 to 10,000 local recall attempts since 1903.213 For
example, over the last 10 years, Oregon alone has had a total of 114
recalls, all on the local level. Michigan, the next largest state by
population to have a full state-level recall law, has had at least 515 recall
threats and 175 recall votes, and all but one of the votes took place on
the local level.214
As with California, the issue is not a lack of recall threats. For
example, most Michigan governors since 1983 have faced recall
threats.215 In 2020, nationwide 14 governors faced recall attempts; only
California’s governor recall qualified.216 Beyond the difficulty in getting
enough signatures, the reality is that the more partisan nature of statelevel politics may inhibit recall campaigns. As political scientist
Lawrence Sych said: “[s]igning a petition for recall is often more than
repudiating a single state official—it is also a rejection of his or her
party.”217
From our review and comparison of recalls in California and across
the nation, we reach several conclusions. State-level recall drives
happen far less often than local recall drives in California, based on
comparing the California-specific state and local data. State-level recall
drives happen far less often than local recall drives consistently across
California, other states, and nationwide. The data in California and other
recall states show that the recall is primarily a local tool, and that state
officer recalls qualify at low rates. Therefore, it is unnecessary to

213. SPIVAK, supra note 21, at 88.
214. Mark Z. Barabak, There are some drastic ideas to overhaul California’s recall. Be
careful, says one expert, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
politics/story/2021-09-28/expert-warnings-california-recall-election-reform.
215. See Aaron Parseghian, Whitmer recall petitions can move forward, face tall order
due to law change, FOX17 (May 30, 2021, 10:16 PM), https://www.fox17online.com/
news/politics/whitmer-recall-petitions-can-move-forward-face-tall-order-due-to-law-change;
Joshua Spivak, Scott Walker and the Strange Rise in Recall Elections, ATLANTIC (May 16,
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/scott-walker-and-the-strangerise-in-recall-elections/257263/ [hereinafter Spivak, Strange Rise in Recall Elections]; Ed
Brayton, Granholm recall petition gets approval, MICH. MESSENGER (Sept. 17, 2009, 6:56
AM), https://web.archive.org/web/20101109035654/http://michiganmessenger.com/26428/
granholm-recall-petition-gets-approval; Engler recall campaign gets underway, UPI (May 20,
1991), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/05/20/Engler-recall-campaign-gets-under-way/
9816674712000/?spt=su; Recall Blanchard Comm. v. Sec’y of State, 380 N.W.2d 71 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1985).
216. Joshua Spivak, Recall Attempts Blew Up in 2020 — and COVID Had Everything to
Do With It, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 30, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/recallelections-covid-1557963 [hereinafter Spivak, Recall Attempts Blew Up in 2020].
217. Lawrence Sych, State Recall Elections: What Explains Their Outcomes?, 17 COMP.
ST. POL. 7, 9 (1996).
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consider state officer recall reforms, or at least less necessary than for
the local recall process.
V. RECALL REFORM PROPOSALS ANALYZED
Our assessment is that the data analysis does not justify making it
more difficult to use the recall at the state or the local level, and that the
existing hurdles that prevent recalls from qualifying for the ballot are
sufficient to prevent waste of public resources while permitting voters to
hold elected officials accountable. We first evaluate two competing
views of California’s recall. The critical approach views the recall as an
out-of-control fire hose wielded by the wealthy interests the recall was
intended to combat. We present responses to that view and conclude
that the opposing view is better supported by our data and California’s
experience. In our view, the recall in California overall performs largely
as intended: as a public referendum on an official’s policies that is rarely
deployed and (when it is deployed) serves to validate those policies.
A. The recall is already hard enough to deploy
Critics charge that the recall does not meet the idealistic vision of
the Progressive movement.218 This has been so since the recall’s birth in
1911.219 Intended to give political power to the voters and to curb
wealthy influences on California politics, critics argue that the recall
failed in that mission.220 There is some support for this: as our review of
the state official recalls shows, interest groups and major political parties
use recalls to attack their political opponents.221 Rather than using the
recall to get interests out of California politics, some argue that the
interests themselves are using the recall for their own ends.222

218. See The Editorial Bd., California’s Recall Election Is Broken, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/09/opinion/california-recall-newsom.html.
219. JOHN RANDOLPH HAYNES, DIRECT GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA, S. DOC. NO. 738,
at 5 (2d Sess. 1917). Haynes, credited as the recall’s modern father, rebuts many of the same
complaints that are made today.
220. See Ronald Brownstein, The Trouble With the Gavin Newsom Recall, ATLANTIC
(May 13, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/05/newsom-recallcalifornia/618872/.
221. There also is contrary evidence. While there is risk that the recall “can be employed
for partisan purposes, . . . it seldom has been so used.” ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 129-30
(noting that recall use to frivolously harass officials is “exceptional”).
222. See Recall of State Officials, supra note 3 (click on “Pros and Cons” tab) (“Opponents
argue that recalls can lead to an excess of democracy: That the threat of a recall election
lessens the independence of elected officials; undermines the principle of electing good
officials and giving them a chance to govern; and can be abused by well-financed special
interest groups and give them undue influence over the political process.”).
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Whether wealthy interests still rule California politics and the recall
failed its Progressive promises is debatable. Yet our data analysis shows
that current recall requirements are sufficiently rigorous to prevent its
abuse, or at least make it so rare as to be an outlier. Pursuing
fundamental change to chase edge cases seems to be both a waste of
resources and a tacit acknowledgement that the system already works
well. Despite being easy to invoke compared with other states, few
California recall petitions qualify, and even fewer result in a vacant seat.
This suggests that California’s recall is well-calibrated: difficult enough
to exercise to prevent abuse, but not so onerous as to be unusable.
Concerns about political polarization, cost to taxpayers, and potential for
factional strife all seem plausible, yet the fact that despite numerous
petitions few qualify for the ballot (and even fewer succeed) suggests
that those concerns have not proved to be significant factors.
Several other factors may be more influential. A recall campaign’s
costs can substantially impact the qualifying rate. Using professional
signature-gathering companies—typically a practical necessity to run a
statewide campaign in California—requires millions of dollars.223 And
the fact that California’s electorate is generally conservative (in the sense
that it rejects far more measures than it approves) at the ballot may affect
the success rate.224 Voter fatigue may also be a factor: except for the
Newsom recall effort, repeated recall attempts against the same governor
have not resulted in greater success (and Newsom defeated his recall).
State-level petitions in recall states are rare when considered alone
or when compared with the local recall, which is much more frequently
used.225 Across all statewide offices in all recall states, far more recall
efforts fizzle than qualify for an election: the proponents abandon the
effort, fail to gather enough valid petition signatures, run out of funds,
or fall short from some combination of those factors.226 The recall’s
originators predicted that it would be used sparingly, and early
California commentators concluded that this proved to be accurate.227
223. Carrillo, Duvernay, Gevercer & Fenzel, supra note 6, at 597-98.
224. Id. at 580-81 (noting that around 34% of all initiatives pass, with a maximum possible
success rate for initiatives on any given ballot regardless how many initiatives are qualified).
225. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 19, 48 (calling statewide officer recalls an
“infrequent occurrence”); see also id. at 59 (noting that the recall “somewhat surprisingly has
been little used” against state officers); id. at 78 (concluding that fears about the recall’s
frequent use to disrupt representative government have proved “unfounded” given how
“seldom” the recall is used).
226. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 19 (noting that state officer recalls have been
“infrequent, in part because of the difficulty of collecting signatures on petitions”).
227. See id. at xi (quoting Robert M. La Follette in 1920: the recall tools “will prove so
effective a check against unworthy representatives that it will rarely be found necessary to
invoke them”); BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 19-20 (“[W]hen the large number of officials
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We agree: modern national and California experience over a much larger
timeframe supports a conclusion that the recall is rarely employed.
On these facts, we conclude that the recall is not overpowered in
recall states generally, or in California specifically, because of its low
qualifying rates and even lower success rates. In fact, the initiative is
deployed comparatively far more often than the recall, in California and
nationwide.228 This makes the initiative’s political impact far greater
than the recall. Nor is California the leader among recall states: as noted
above, Michigan has more recall petitions on the local level than
California, and Oregon is about equal to California.229 From those
comparisons and California’s 110 years of experience, the recall is an
infrequently used tool that is less disruptive to the political sphere than
its enactors may have imagined, or its opponents fear.230
Although some policy leaders believe the device should be limited
solely to corruption and misconduct allegations,231 California’s recall
which have fallen within the jurisdiction of the recall is borne in mind, the number of those
who have fallen victims to its operation is still comparatively insignificant.”).
228. See Carrillo, Duvernay, Gevercer & Fenzel, supra note 6, at 578 tbl.4 (showing more
and more consistent California initiative usage compared with the fewer and more periodic
recall uses discussed here); see also Rich Braunstein, State Initiatives Since 1904 – 2000,
INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/docs/Statewide-Initiatives1904-2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2022); Initiatives (number, approved) by State and Year
(1904–2019) sheet, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/
docs/Number%20initiatives%20by%20state-year%20(1904-2019).xls (last visited Apr. 3,
2022) (similarly showing more and more consistent initiative usage across all direct
democracy states compared with their recall usage discussed here); cf. History of California
Initiatives: Initiative Totals by Title and Summary Year 1912-2022, CAL. SECRETARY ST.,
https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov//ballot-measures/pdf/initiative-totals-summary-year.pdf (last
visited Apr. 3, 2022) (listing California state-wide initiative historical data); Initiative states
compared by number of initiatives on their ballot, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Initiative_states_compared_by_number_of_initiatives_on_their_ballot (last visited Apr. 3,
2022) (more initiative data).
229. See Barabak, supra note 214. See generally CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF
MICH., MICHIGAN’S RECALL ELECTION LAW 1-5 (2012), https://crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/
2010s/2012/rpt379.pdf.
230. This longer experience validates the view in 1930 that after 25 years the recall
“realized neither the highest hopes of its sanguine originators nor the darkest prophecies of its
cynical opponents,” producing neither “a democratic Utopia” nor causing “political
demoralization and chaos” given that it was deployed both to “drive from office unfaithful,
incompetent, and arbitrary officials” and also employed “on occasion, without justification or
beneficial result.” BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 342. Those authors concluded (from a much
smaller dataset than ours) that “on the whole the recall has been employed with moderation,”
that only “a somewhat negligible percentage of public officials become involved in recall
proceedings,” and that the recall has been “applied almost exclusively to local government
officials.” Id. at 342-43. Zimmerman reaches similar conclusions. See ZIMMERMAN, supra
note 7, at 131.
231. See Joshua Osborne-Klein, Comment, Electoral Recall in Washington State and
California: California Needs Stricter Standards to Protect Elected Officials from
Harassment, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 145, 147 (2004); Recall isn’t the proper response,
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was never intended to have these limits. The original debates
surrounding its adoption focus on the recall of judges, and on permitting
the voters to resolve policy disputes.232 And experience proves that
policy is the clear focus in recall efforts.233 Nearly all the recalls in
California and throughout the United States over the last decade
involved significant policy disputes, with very few involving corruption.
For example, the unprecedented number of recall attempts in 2020
and 2021 primarily targeted nonpartisan state and local officials
(especially school board leaders) who had taken steps to combat the
COVID-19 pandemic.234 The pandemic restrictions that resulted in
shutdowns of schools and businesses were among the most extensive
policy changes in United States history. It is not surprising that voters
who opposed these policies would want to take electoral action. Some of
those recall campaigns were intraparty attempts, which shows that recall
campaigns were being used as a means to address internal dissension
over policy positions.235 With most attempts failing to qualify and
almost all being defeated at the ballot, the results of these attempts
strongly ratified the pandemic policies. Thus, the recall bolstered the
policy positions of the targeted officials and helped resolve policy
disputes.236
Finally, we note that major recall reform requires constitutional
changes, which seems unlikely. California voters strongly favored the
recall at its inception and still do today.237 Commentators have long been
NORFOLK DAILY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2015), https://norfolkdailynews.com/blogs/recall-isnt-theproper-response/article_63f9ce2e-855c-11e5-b809-2b320860b4e2.html; Dick Spotswood,
Glickman Could avoid recall effort by running again, MARIN INDEP. J. (June 15, 2019, 9:57
AM), https://www.marinij.com/2019/06/15/dick-spotswood-glickman-could-avoid-recalleffort-by-running-again/.
232. GATES & CLARK, supra note 12 (“Laws henceforth under the enlarging powers of
the people will embody the will and spirit of the people; in fact, will be what laws should
always be—a transcription of the will, wisdom, and spirit of the people and of their times.”).
233. See Siegel, supra note 68, at 329 (“[P]olitically-motivated recalls generally serve as
a referendum on one political issue.”).
234. Joshua Spivak, Year that broke the recall? Why COVID led to recalls flopping
nationwide, HILL (Dec. 30, 2021, 1:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/587702year-that-broke-the-recall-why-covid-led-to-recalls-flopping-nationwide/
[hereinafter
Spivak, Year that broke the recall].
235. See Ruth Brown, Effort to recall Idaho Gov. Little fails, E. IDAHO NEWS.COM (Aug.
12, 2020, 8:11 PM), https://www.eastidahonews.com/2020/08/effort-to-recall-idaho-govlittle-fails/; Scott Bourque, Effort To Recall Arizona Gov. Ducey Gains Unlikely Support from
Paul Gosar, KJZZ (Dec. 6, 2020, 3:16 PM), https://kjzz.org/content/1641158/effort-recallarizona-gov-ducey-gains-unlikely-support-paul-gosar.
236. See Spivak, Year that broke the recall, supra note 234.
237. The recall was approved by a vote of 4 to 1, and it received the second largest vote
and won by the largest majority out of all 23 proposals on the 1911 special election ballot.
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 13; BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 54. In a 2021 poll, 86% of
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skeptical of restricting the recall because the fact that “the people are
sometimes vanquished by their own weapon is no justification for
depriving them of . . . a potential means of protection.”238 Strong voter
support coupled with the fact that the electorate must approve any
constitutional changes to the recall makes radical reforms unlikely to
pass.
In the following sections we consider several proposed reforms to
California’s recall and conclude that only two (the qualifying signature
number and the replacement candidate procedure) are worth
considering. Part of our analysis here relies on the experience of other
recall states. Some of the reforms proposed for California’s recall are
already features of the recall in other recall states, and their experience
with the design features discussed in this section should inform
California’s decisions.
1. Requiring malfeasance
Recent California polls show support for requiring specific grounds
for a recall.239 A malfeasance requirement has common-sense appeal
because it seems consistent with the concept of the recall as a means to
remedy official misconduct that resembles a quasi-impeachment
mechanism. Voters might expect that adopting a malfeasance
requirement would prevent the recall from being abused for political and
policy disputes. Eight of the 19 recall states require specific grounds for
a recall, known as malfeasance because the required grounds all
California voters said it was a “good thing” that the state constitution permits recalling elected
officials. Mark Baldassare, What’s Wrong With the California Recall?, PUB. POL’Y INST.
CAL. (July 27, 2021), https://www.ppic.org/blog/whats-wrong-with-the-recall/.
238. BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 351. Mike Tate, former chair of the Democratic Party
of Wisconsin, stated during the campaign to recall Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker that the
recall “enhance[s]” democracy and is a “just and proper tool to hold . . . elected officials
accountable for their actions.” Mike Tate, Recall Elections Enhance Democracy, U.S. NEWS
(May 10, 2011, 10:33 AM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/05/10/recallelections-enhance-democracy. Academics have also praised the recall as the “best
possibility… to function as a democratic tool against [political] extremism.” Anthoula
Malkopoulou, Flipped elections: can recalls improve democracy?, CONVERSATION (Oct. 14,
2015, 11:06 PM), https://theconversation.com/flipped-elections-can-recalls-improvedemocracy-46395.
239. Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies (IGS) and UC San Diego Yankelovich
Center for Social Science Research polled this issue during the 2021 Newsom recall. See
MARK DICAMILLO, BERKELEY IGS POLL, WHILE THERE IS BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN
CALIFORNIA TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO RECALL ELECTED OFFICIALS, MAJORITIES FAVOR
REFORMING THE PROCESS 1 (2021), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6kt7w3ts; THAD
KOUSSER & CASSIDY RELLER, U.C. SAN DIEGO YANKELOVICH CENTER FOR SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH, REFORMING THE RECALL? CALIFORNIA VOTERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON
THE PROCESS 9 (2021), https://yankelovichcenter.ucsd.edu/_files/reports/Reforming-TheRecall-California-Voters-Perspectives-On-The-Process-FINAL.pdf.
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generally concern misconduct in office that either constitutes or
resembles criminal acts.240 For example, Alaska requires “lack of
fitness, incompetence, neglect of duties or corruption;”241 Georgia,
Minnesota, and Washington require “malfeasance” in office;242 Kansas
requires conviction of a felony, official misconduct, or dereliction of
duty;243 Montana requires unfitness, misconduct, or a felony
conviction;244 and Rhode Island requires a criminal conviction or ethical
violation.245
A malfeasance requirement makes the recall unusable.246 The
recall’s adopters in the “any reason or no reason” states like California
understood and intended that recalls should be used for political reasons
and to impact policy.247 Recalls will become extremely rare if California
adopts a malfeasance standard: of the 48 state-level successful recalls in
United States history, only one occurred in a malfeasance state.248 In the
past decade, only 7 local recalls have qualified in the most populous
malfeasance state (Washington), while 114 have qualified in
neighboring Oregon (a smaller “any reasons” state).249 California has
240. JOSHUA SPIVAK, RECALL PETITION MAY NOT HOLD UP TO ALASKA LAW (2017),
https://wagner.edu/newsroom/files/2017/09/170518-Homer-AK-Tribune-Recall-petitionmay-not-hold-up-to-Alaska-law-Spivak-op-ed.pdf [hereinafter SPIVAK, ALASKA LAW
RECALL PETITION].
241. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.510 (2021). A recent decision in Alaska may have paved the
way for it to effectively become a political recall state. See State v. Recall Dunleavy, 491 P.3d
343 (Alaska 2021).
242. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-4-3(7), 21-4-4(c) (2021); MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 6; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 33.
243. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4302 (West 2021). This malfeasance requirement may lack
teeth. Section 25-4302 states that “No recall submitted to the voters shall be held void because
of the insufficiency of the grounds, application, or petition by which the submission was
procured.” Id.
244. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-16-603 (2021).
245. R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
246. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 57. “[V]oters typically experience greater difficulty”
in removing officials in malfeasance states. Id.
247. See GATES & CLARK, supra note 12. The ballot argument in favor of California’s
1911 Senate Constitutional Amendment no. 23 described the recall as a means:
[T]o require a public servant . . . whose stewardship is questioned by [the
proponents] to submit the question of his continuance in office to a vote of the
electors.
If a majority of all voting at the election say that their servant is unfit to serve
them longer, he is thereby retired.
Id. And it similarly framed the recall as “[t]he power to remove a dishonest, incapable, or
unsatisfactory servant.” Id. (emphasis added).
248. See Spivak, Recall Elections in the US, supra note 146, at 80; Washington, 1981. At
the time, Washington’s Supreme Court had opened up the recall to a more political version.
The 1984 Supreme Court seemed to have shifted the state permanently into the malfeasance
standard column. See Cole v. Webster, 692 P.2d 799 (Wash. 1984).
249. See Recall data archive, supra note 192 for supporting data and calculations.
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seen 5 successful state legislator recalls, but as discussed above only one
(Marshall Black) concerned actual corruption.250 This difference shows
that a malfeasance standard is very effective at achieving its design
purpose of barring recalls for reasons other than malfeasance and
suggests that recalls would be rare if California became a malfeasance
state.
The qualifying disparity exists because malfeasance thresholds are
inherently more difficult to satisfy. Proof of actual malfeasance is less
available than mere public disapproval, and courts can (and have)
intervened to halt recalls that they viewed as showing insufficient
malfeasance grounds.251 Malfeasance short of charged criminal conduct
is particularly difficult, and arguably more prevalent: “stupid bunglers”
are more common than “shrewd corruptionists” and the inherent
difficulty of proving non-criminal misconduct “is in itself sufficient
reason for a remedy which, while perhaps assuming some form of
malfeasance, does not involve the necessity of proving it.”252 A
malfeasance requirement may also make signature gathering more
difficult if voters, guided by specific grounds for a recall, refuse to sign
petitions that in their mind fall short of the required malfeasance
threshold.
Requiring cause for a recall will reduce the electorate’s recall power
by making it far more difficult to exercise. Requiring reasons will make
recall campaigns more expensive and difficult even in cases of clear
misconduct, because proponents will be forced to litigate expensive
court battles over sufficiency before beginning the signature process.
Adjudicating sufficiency will force courts into the political thicket as
arbiters of what qualifies as appropriate grounds.253 A malfeasance
requirement is antithetical to the recall’s original intent, which was to
250. See COMPLETE LIST OF RECALL ATTEMPTS, supra note 1; BIRD & RYAN, supra note
9, at 271-72.
251. Courts in Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, and Washington have quashed recall
attempts for insufficient grounds. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 32-36.
252. BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 348; cf. Hanlon’s razor: “Never attribute to malice
that which is adequately explained by stupidity.”
253. For example, a Washington state court recently quashed a recall petition against
Governor Jay Inslee after a costly court battle. See Kyle Lamb, Inslee Warns of ‘Relitigating
Elections’ After Recall Dismissal, KPQ (June 19, 2021), https://www.kpq.com/inslee-warnsof-relitigating-elections-after-recall-dismissal/. Washington’s constitution (article I, § 33)
limits recalls to public officials who have “committed some act or acts of malfeasance or
misfeasance while in office, or who has violated his oath of office.” WASH. CONST. art. I, §
33. According to the Washington Attorney General, the court dismissed the recall petition on
the grounds that the 5 allegations were “legally and factually insufficient.” Judge dismisses
Washington state governor recall petition, AP NEWS (June 17, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/washington-coronavirus-pandemic-business-government-andpolitics-health-baaac44648aeb9b3dcb850b20eb447a9.
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“give to the electorate the power of action when desired.”254 Adopting a
malfeasance standard is likely to neuter California’s recall.
2. Automatic replacement
To the extent that a “most common” system for replacing a recalled
official exists it is some form of automatic replacement, which is the case
in 11 of the 19 recall states.255 Automatically replacing a recalled official
with the order of succession method has some benefits: it can reduce
costs and possibly prevent recalls that are merely attempts to reverse the
past election. Yet this feature has serious drawbacks. It would “solve”
a problem with direct democracy by instituting the least democratic
option available: where the system designates the replacement, not the
voters. It would transform the recall into another impeachment
process.256 And the argument that it prevents relitigating the past
election is suspect. The experience of other recall states shows that
automatic replacement does not lessen recall attempts; instead, it may
increase recall attempts against other state officials in the line of
succession.
California’s two gubernatorial recall elections targeted the
governor alone because the existing simultaneous replacement system
removes incentives to target officials in the line of succession. But in
past gubernatorial recalls in other states with automatic replacement
systems the proponents simply targeted the replacement officials. For
example, in 1921, the North Dakota electorate removed the governor,
the attorney general, and the agriculture-and-labor commissioner.257 In
2012, gubernatorial recall proponents in Wisconsin gathered an
additional 900,000 signatures to also successfully qualify a recall against
the lieutenant governor.258 Indeed, historically multi-candidate recall
attempts are the rule, not the exception. There have been 116 recall votes
in California in the last 11 years; in 32 of those elections more than 1
official was on the ballot, compared to 27 times when only 1 official saw
254. Hiram W. Johnson, Governor of Cal., First Inaugural Address (Jan. 3, 1911),
https://governors.library.ca.gov/addresses/23-hjohnson01.html.
255. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 152, at 38 app. 2, tbl.1.
256. When a statewide officer is impeached and removed, the governor appoints a
replacement. CAL. GOV. CODE § 3038 (Deering 2021). When a governor is impeached and
removed, the lieutenant governor automatically becomes governor. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 10.
257. Those 3 officials made up the Industrial Commission and were in charge of several
state-sponsored entities. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 61.
258. See MJ Lee, Wis. Dems tout 1M recall signatures, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2012, 7:16
AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2012/01/wisconsin-dems-tout-1-million-recallsignatures-071548. Joshua Spivak & David A. Carrillo, Don’t break California’s Recall by
‘fixing’ it, HILL (Oct. 15, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/576936-dontbreak-californias-recall-by-fixing-it/.
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a vote. Automatic replacement will not guarantee an orderly succession;
instead, it more likely will increase the number of targeted officials.
Automatic replacement also exacerbates the conflict potential between a
governor and the potential replacement official (commonly the
lieutenant governor). Fifteen states saw recall attempts against
governors between 2019 and 2021.259 The two most serious attempts
were in Oregon and Alaska—both of which use the automatic
replacement model.260 Due to a quirk in Oregon’s law, its automatic
replacement process nearly caused a constitutional crisis.261
Rather than removing politics from the recall process, automatic
replacement systems eliminate voter choice, encourage tactical partisan
behavior, and potentially increase the likelihood of a multi-candidate
recall effort. Concerns about automatic replacements are particularly
acute in California, which has a separately-elected executive branch and
often elects governors and lieutenant governors from different parties: it
was so from 1979 to 1999. An automatic replacement system in
California could cause more frequent politically motivated recalls.
3. Increasing the qualifying signature requirement
The signature gathering phase is perhaps the most critical phase of
the recall campaign.262 Qualifying a recall petition requires significant
financial resources to gather signatures, and consequently most recall
attempts fold when proponents fail to gather enough signatures to meet
the requirement.263 This shows that signature requirements are an
effective filter and proxy for voter interest: the frequent inability to
259. Spivak & Carrillo, supra note 258.
260. Id.
261. Id. Oregon does not have a lieutenant governor; its secretary of state is next in line.
The secretary of state was a Republican, but that official died in office. Id. Under Oregon law,
a non-elected replacement was not eligible to succeed to the governor’s office—but the recall
petitioners challenged this and were prepared to fight any effort to bypass the Republican in
court. Id.
262. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 57 (noting that a recall campaign’s success “is
influenced heavily by the threshold petition signature requirement”).
263. Recall of State Officials, supra note 3 (click “History” tab) (“Many more recall
efforts are started and never make it to the election stage; either they are abandoned by their
sponsors, or they fail to gather enough valid petition signatures to trigger an election.”).
Newsom recall proponent, Orrin Heatlie, said of the California recall election:
“It’s a very difficult process as it is,” noting that his petition drive was the only one
of several efforts to recall Newsom to go forward. “If they were that easily done,
then it would be something that people did all the time,” he said. “Very few of them
get as far as this one did, for good reason. It’s a very difficult process as it stands.”
Eric Bradner & Dan Merica, ‘A $276 million waste’: California Democrats seek changes to
recall process after Newsom’s landslide, CNN (Sept. 16, 2021, 3:33 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/16/politics/california-recall-waste-of-time-andmoney/index.html.
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garner initial support from even a small percentage of likely voters
suggests the absence of deep untapped wells of voter interest in recalls.
This makes the signature requirement critical to the balance
between accessibility and abuse because a low signature requirement
“obviously encourages” recalls.264 There are two common standards for
calculating signature requirements: either a percentage of registered
voters in the jurisdiction, or of turnout in the past election.265 Local
governments in California historically experimented with signature
requirements that range from 10 to 55% of the total vote in the last
election for the office.266 The most common modern signature
requirement is 25%; Kansas has the highest requirement and, as
discussed above, California arguably has the lowest.267
California’s 12% signature requirement may be on the low end of
the metrics, but the real number is much higher because California is the
most populous state.268 This partly explains why, despite California’s
seemingly low signature requirement, it has proved quite difficult to
meet. For example, the qualifying rate for California gubernatorial recall
attempts is under 4% (2 of 55), and just 6% (11 of 179) of recall attempts
of any California state official collected enough signatures to qualify for
the ballot.269 And both California gubernatorial recalls that qualified did
so in unusual circumstances. The 2002 gubernatorial election saw the
lowest voter turnout in California history, making the 2003 Davis recall
effort relatively easy to qualify.270 The 2021 Newsom recall campaign
proponents benefited from additional time to gather signatures during
the COVID-19 pandemic; absent that extra time, it is unlikely the
Newsom recall would have qualified.271
Increasing the requirement would make it harder for recalls to
qualify. Given the already-high bar to qualifying statewide officer
recalls in California and the low qualifying rate of past recall attempts,

264. See BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 61-62.
265. The signature threshold usually is based on turnout in the last election for that office.
In some jurisdictions, the number is calculated based on turnout in the governor’s race in that
jurisdiction (which is invariably a higher bar). See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text
(discussing different jurisdiction signature threshold requirements) and Tables 5 and 6
(showing recall qualification signature requirements by state, population, and rule).
266. See BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 17. “The recall laws of California illustrate almost
every conceivable variation in recall procedure.” Id. at 17 n.31.
267. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 39.
268. Carrillo, Spivak & Stracener, supra note 73. For example, Montana’s far lower
population makes its real signatures number far lower than California’s. Id.
269. See Recall History in California (1913 to Present), supra note 63.
270. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
271. Korte, supra note 144.
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this proposal seems like a solution to a nonexistent problem.272 As
Table 6 shows, California has the lowest signature requirement as a
percentage of population regardless of the qualifying rule (it ties with
Montana if the rule is eligible voters). But due to its largest-in-the-nation
population California has the highest real signatures number regardless
of rule. Montana has the lowest real signatures number regardless of
rule. California has by far the largest upward deviation from the median
real number, regardless of rule: over triple if by eligible, nearly triple if
by registered or by turnout. As Table 6 shows, moving California close
to the median as percent of population would require doubling the
signature requirement to 25% regardless of rule. That would make our
percent-of-population metric similar to Kansas, which currently has the
highest signature requirement as a percentage of population regardless
of rule. And doing so would make California deviate even farther
upward from the median real number.
Making statewide officer recalls more difficult to qualify by
increasing the signature requirement seems unnecessary because past
attempts show that the existing standard is already difficult to satisfy. 273
Other solutions here are similarly problematic. For example, one
proposal would progressively increase the signature requirements for
successive recalls attempts.274 But that would only further hinder recall
qualifications. A progressive increase in the signature requirement
would have made it almost impossible to qualify the 2021 Newsom
recall election, because it was the sixth attempt against that officer. An
alternative solution would require recall proponents to reimburse the
state for unsuccessful recall attempts by requiring them to post a bond.
For example, Pomona’s original recall system required proponents to
deposit a certified check “for an amount equal to the cost of the last recall
election” against the targeted official.275 Both of these ideas have
negative consequences. If signature requirements progressively increase
with repeated attempts, the targeted candidate’s supporters can start fake
recall attempts to raise the signature requirements, which has happened
272. For a contrary view, see Siegel, supra note 68, at 337-39 (arguing that increasing the
currently low signature requirements for recall petitions would force organizers of politicallymotivated recalls to find a wider support base, ensure that the political motivation for the
recall was one of the constituents’ “sacred cows,” and slow the recall process, with the overall
result of making recalls a “last resort” for political activists “rather than the modus operandi”).
273. BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 20 (“[W]hen the large number of officials which have
fallen within the jurisdiction of the recall is borne in mind, the number of those who have
fallen victims to its operation is still comparatively insignificant.”).
274. For example, the original San Francisco recall system started at 10% then doubled
for a second attempt and tripled for a third try; Berkeley required 15% for a first attempt and
30% for a second attempt. See id. at 66-67.
275. Id. at 70.
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in other states.276 And requiring recall proponents to pay the cost of an
election takes the device out of the hands of the voters and makes using
the recall a punitive undertaking.277
The better reform idea is to adopt the standard used by California’s
largest cities: a registered voter requirement with a 10% threshold.278
Doing so would primarily provide clarity, with a secondary effect of
modestly increasing the signature requirement. The registered voter
requirement reduces the variability of tying the recall to turnout in the
last election and sets a more consistent standard. That consistency would
reduce tactical calendaring incentives for recalls following unusually
low-turnout elections. It also addresses calls to raise the signature
requirement: if applied to the 2021 Newsom recall, a 10% of registration
standard would have modestly raised the required signatures to over 2.2
million, versus the 1.5 million required by the current 12% of turnout
standard.279
Our analysis shows that a clear majority (94% of state petitions,
75% of local petitions) of recall attempts fail to qualify. And overall,
just a few recall petitions (3.4% of state petitions, 15.5% of local
petitions) will succeed at the ballot. Those high failure and low success
margins show that the existing signature requirements are an effective
filter. Because most recall attempts fail to qualify, the few attempts that
do qualify command strong voter interest on the question of whether to
276. Supporters of Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker filed the first recall petitions in
2011, a week before the Democratic effort against Walker began. See Jason Stein & Lee
Bergquist, First recall effort launched against Walker, triggering unlimited fundraising,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 4, 2011), https://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/
first-recall-effort-against-gov-scott-walker-formally-launched-friday-e22u587133257928.html/. The reason appeared to be to give Walker extra time to raise funds for his
recall defense (somewhat like California, there are no limits for donations in a recall). See id.
277. Keyser City, West Virginia appears to shift liability for the cost of the election to
everyone who signed the petition. See Elaine Blaisdell, Petition for Keyser recall election
given to city official, CUMBERLAND TIMES-NEWS (May 17, 2012), https://www.timesnews.com/news/local_news/petition-for-keyser-recall-election-given-to-city-official/article_
269ca806-beb2-573e-bc51-7c0fdbe879bc.html.
278. See ELECTION COORDINATION UNIT, L.A. CTY. REGISTRAR-RECORDER/CTY.
CLERK, A GUIDE TO RECALL FOR COUNTY, SCHOOL, SPECIAL DISTRICT AND LOCAL OFFICES
8 (2022), https://www.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/documents/guide-to-recall.pdf?v=6.
279. Note that this change requires a constitutional amendment. The California
constitution states that:
A petition to recall a statewide officer must be signed by electors equal in number
to 12 percent of the last vote for the office, with signatures from each of 5 counties
equal in number to 1 percent of the last vote for the office in the county. Signatures
to recall Senators, members of the Assembly, members of the Board of
Equalization, and judges of courts of appeal and trial courts must equal in number
20 percent of the last vote for the office.
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b). And it would unhitch the recall from the initiative and
referendum, which would still be tied to gubernatorial turnout. See id.
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remove the target. Rather than making the recall too easy to use and
flooding ballots with spurious challenges, the existing qualifying
requirements eliminate the weak campaigns and focus voter attention on
potentially meritorious questions.
4. Clarifying the replacement candidate procedure
California law is vague on two key issues in a gubernatorial recall:
the qualifying requirements for replacement candidates, and the time
window for qualifying. In recall elections for California governors, the
secretary of state sets the procedures, and the lieutenant governor sets
the date.280 Those discretionary powers have significant individual
consequences and combine to have major impacts on the replacement
field. We suggest focusing reform efforts on clarifying those points.
California’s procedures for primary elections do not apply to
recalls.281 This statutory silence effectively grants the secretary of state
discretion to impose any set of reasonable requirements on the
replacement candidates.282 In both the 2003 Davis and the 2021
Newsom recalls, California’s secretaries of state chose to use the party
primary procedure, which requires just 65 signatures to qualify as a
replacement candidate.283
The other option was to apply the
requirements for independent candidates, which would have required
221,544 signatures to qualify for the 2021 Gavin Newson recall ballot.284
This decision has ballot integrity consequences. In 2003, the recall ballot
featured 135 names, many of which were not serious candidates.285 In

280. California Gubernatorial Recall Election – Frequently Asked Questions, CAL.
SECRETARY ST., https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/prior-elections/statewide-election-results/
2021-ca-gov-recall/newsom-recall-faqs (last visited Sept. 23, 2022) [hereinafter California
Gubernatorial Recall Election].
281. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8000(a) (Deering 2021).
282. The California Supreme Court interpreted California Election Code section 11328 to
give the secretary of state great deference in her decision. See Burton v. Shelley, No. S117834,
2003 WL 21962000, at *1 (Cal. Aug. 7, 2003).
283. ELEC. §§ 8062(a)(1).
284. See id. §§ 8300, 8400; see also CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, ODD-NUMBERED YEAR
REPORT OF REGISTRATION 1 (2021), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ror/ror-odd-year2021/historical-reg-stats.pdf [hereinafter ODD-NUMBERED YEAR REPORT]; CAL. SEC’Y OF
STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION 1 (2003), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ror/rorpages/60day-stwdsp-03/hist-reg-stats.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF REGISTRATION].
285. See Rick Lyman, The California Recall: The Candidates; California Voters Wonder:
Is Anyone Not Running?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/
2003/08/16/us/california-recall-candidates-california-voters-wonder-anyone-notrunning.html; Calif. Recall Ballot Will Have 135 Names, AP NEWS (Aug. 14. 2003),
https://apnews.com/article/4444330e8adfdca56ebcd6578a2dc9c0.

2022]

CALIFORNIA’S RECALL IS NOT OVERPOWERED

531

2021, 46 people filed to run as a replacement candidate.286 Having a
parade of jokers on the ballot has obvious negative effects on the public’s
ability to take the matter seriously.
The lieutenant governor has a 20-day window within which to set
the election.287 Her choice affects how long potential replacement
candidates have to qualify for the recall ballot. Depending on when the
lieutenant governor sets the election, potential replacement candidates
could have anywhere from 1 to 21 days to qualify for the ballot.288 The
secretary of state’s broad discretion interacts with the lieutenant
governor’s discretion to set the date of the recall election. A large
signature requirement and a short time frame to qualify could result in
very few candidates making it onto the recall ballot.
In both of California’s gubernatorial recalls the secretary of state
considered only two possible qualifying procedures: the easier party
primary standard, or the harder independent candidate standard.289 Both
chose the easier primary candidate procedure.290 The result is a bareminimum 65 signatures requirement, compared with the independent
standard’s requirement of 1% of all registered California voters.291 In
the 2003 Gray Davis recall, the independent standard would have
required 149,956 valid signatures.292 In the 2021 Gavin Newsom recall,
the independent standard would have required 221,544 signatures.293
A more onerous replacement candidate procedure is beneficial
because it makes the process sufficiently difficult to qualify that only
serious candidates could quickly fund a signature drive. The
constitutional and statutory provisions combine to create a narrow time
window for replacement candidates to gather signatures because
prospective candidates cannot declare candidacy before the election is
286. Laurel Rosenhall & Sameea Kamal, Who’s running in the Newsom recall?
Politicians, activists, Californians of all stripes, CALMATTERS (July 21, 2021),
https://calmatters.org/explainers/newsom-recall-candidates/.
287. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15; ELEC. § 11100.
288. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15(a) (requiring an election to be scheduled within 60-80
days after a recall petition is certified); ELEC. § 11381(a) (requiring nominating petitions to
be filed with the Secretary of State no later than the 59th day before the election).
289. See Bob Wu & Brandon V. Stracener, Two state officials will shape the recall
election, SCOCABLOG (Mar. 26, 2021), http://scocablog.com/two-state-officials-will-shapethe-recall-election/.
290. Id.
291. ELEC. §§ 8300, 8400.
292. See REPORT OF REGISTRATION, supra note 284, at 1. See generally ELEC. §
8062(a)(1) (requiring candidates to collect “not fewer than 65 nor more than 100” signatures
to appear on the ballot); Statewide Special Election — FAQs About Recalls, October 7, 2003,
CAL. SECRETARY ST., https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/prior-elections/statewide-electionresults/statewide-special-election-october-7-2003/frequently-asked-questions#14.
293. See ODD-NUMBERED YEAR REPORT, supra note 284, at 1.

532

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

certified.294 But they must file the required paperwork no less than 59
days before the scheduled recall election,295 which must be held 60 to 80
days after certification.296 The result is a 1–3 week window to gather
signatures. For example, in both the 2003 and 2021 recalls, the
replacement candidates had about 16 days of signature gathering time.297
Professional signature gatherers typically charge approximately $1 to $3
per signature, and that price increases in statewide recalls because timing
is compressed and there are competing players.298 Thus, the independent
candidate procedure likely requires at least $1,000,000 to qualify, which
would bar most frivolous candidates.
The potential downside of a more rigorous replacement candidate
standard (like the 1% requirement for independent candidates) is that it
could unduly burden genuine prospects. The compressed timeframe to
collect signatures is more burdensome than the funding requirement—
even a well-funded candidate might struggle to gather several hundred
thousand signatures in a matter of weeks. The solution here is to
consider a third path: the options are presently limited to the primary and
independent procedures, but not necessarily so. For example, rather than
tying the window to the variable election date, the window could be set
to coincide with another specified time period.299 Doing so would

294. In a regular primary election, California Elections Code section 8020(b) requires that
the declaration of candidacy forms “shall first be available on the 113th day prior to the direct
primary election”—but the election date is unknown until the Lieutenant Governor sets the
election date, which happens only after the Secretary of State certifies the election. ELEC. §
8120.
295. Id. § 11381(a) (“For recalls of state officers, the nomination papers and the
declaration of candidacy shall, in each case, be filed no less than 59 days prior to the date of
the election and not before the day the order of the election is issued. The Secretary of State
shall certify the names of the candidates to be placed on the ballot by the 55th day prior to the
election.”).
296. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15.
297. Wu & Stracener, supra note 289; See Press Release, Shirley N. Weber, Secretary of
State, California Gubernatorial Recall Candidate Filing Deadline Announced (July 21, 2021),
https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2021-news-releasesand-advisories/sw21033-california-gubernatorial-recall-candidate-filing-deadlineannounced.
298. See John Wildermuth, Qualifying a California ballot measure to become a
‘playground of billionaires,’ S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
politics/article/Qualifying-a-California-ballot-measure-to-become-13501800.php; Carrillo,
Duvernay, Gevercer & Fenzel, supra note 6, at, 597-98.
299. For example, California already requires a 30-day signature withdrawal period. See
ELEC. § 11108(b) (“Notwithstanding any other law, any voter who has signed a recall petition
under this chapter shall have the voter’s signature withdrawn from the petition upon the voter
filing a written request that includes the voter’s name, residence address, and signature with
the elections official within 30 business days of the Secretary of State’s notice provided by
subdivision (a).”).
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balance replacement candidates’ interests in qualifying for the ballot
with the state’s interest in efficient election administration.
Clarifying the replacement candidate qualifying procedure with a
higher signature requirement and a set time window will provide clarity
and simplify the process. Because this reform can be accomplished
solely through the statutory process, it is the easiest reform proposal to
enact.
5. The plurality replacement problem
California’s recall procedure requires an “election to determine
whether to recall an officer and, if appropriate, to elect a successor.”300
If an officer is removed and “there is a [replacement] candidate, the
[replacement] candidate who receives a plurality is the successor.”301
Thus, California state officer recalls present voters with a combined
ballot that asks two questions: whether to recall the officer and who will
succeed them.302 Because California law treats the recall as a ballot
measure and the replacement race as a plurality election, a replacement
candidate who receives under 50% of the vote could win. For example,
a recall could result in a replacement candidate being elected even if a
near-majority of 49.9% of voters oppose the recall and the highestplaced replacement candidate receives 40% of the replacement votes. As
long as enough voters support the recall, and the replacement candidate
receives the highest tally relative to other replacement candidates, a
replacement candidate with little voter support could take office.303 This
has happened in at least 5 recalls in the past 10 years, including in
California state Senator Josh Newman’s recall in 2018.304
Although a plurality voting rule sounds unusual, there is no
consensus system in the 19 recall states. And all 8 states with a
replacement election use a plurality voting requirement:
 California and Colorado have a yes-or-no vote on the recall
question followed by a same day replacement.305

300. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15(a)..
301. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 15(c).
302. BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 18.
303. Compare ELEC. §§ 11383-84, with id. § 11385.
304. See Recall History in California (1913 to Present), supra note 63. Newman was
recalled even though he received 15,982 more votes than his replacement. Josh Newman
recall, California State Senate (2017-2018), Ballopedia, https://ballotpedia.org/
Josh_Newman_recall,_California_State_Senate_(2017-2018) (last visited Oct. 25, 2022).
305. See CAL. CONST., art. II, § 15; see also ELEC. § 11320 (using yes-or-no ballot
language); ELEC. §§ 11381(c), 11384, 11385 (discussing same-day replacement); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 1-12-116 (2021) (yes-or-no recall question); § 1-12-118 (same-day replacement);
LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 152, at 38 app. 2, tbl.1.
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 Illinois and Georgia have a yes-or-no vote on the recall followed
by a replacement vote on a later date.306
 Arizona, Nevada, North Dakota, and Wisconsin have a new
election.307
 11 states (Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Washington) appear to have a yes-or-no vote with an automatic
replacement: the lieutenant governor or secretary of state
replaces a recalled governor.308 Other recalled officials
generally are also replaced by an appointment.309
Changing the plurality vote rule would require a constitutional
amendment. The current system of a same-day replacement plurality
election is lawful, but it seems unfair due to the possibility that the
winning replacement candidate may have fewer votes than those who
voted to retain a recalled official.310 Replacing the plurality with a
majority vote rule seems like the simplest solution: it arguably fits with
the common understanding of how an election should work.311 The
problem with adopting a majority vote replacement rule is that failing to
change the replacement election to accommodate the new voting rule
will create other problems. In a crowded same-day field election it may
be impossible for one candidate to muster a majority, leaving the office
vacant. Solving that issue would require changing the new election
model. One common proposal is to hold a separate runoff election
306. ILL. CONST. art III, § 7 (b)-(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-4-13 (e)-(g) (2010); see also
LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 152, at 38 app. 2, tbl.1.
307. Arizona does the replacement on the same day as the recall election, as do Nevada
and North Dakota. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-212 (2021), with NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 306.070 (2021), and N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-08-21 (2019). Wisconsin law provides for recall
primary elections before the main recall election if more than two persons compete for the
office that the targeted official holds. WIS. STAT. § 9.10 (3)(c)-(f) (2019-20); see also LITTLE
HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 152, at 38 app. 2, tbl.1.
308. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 152, at 38 app. 3, tbl.1. Only 3 of these
states (Idaho, Oregon, and Washington) have had a recall of a state legislator. Sych, supra
note 217, at 20-21. The laws in some of the other states may allow for the replacement by an
election model, though the language appears to favor the automatic replacement method.
309. Michigan has the automatic replacement model solely for governors and uses a new
election for other officials. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 152, at 38-40 app. 2,
tbls.1, 2 & 3. New Jersey uses the automatic replacement for state-level officials and a laterdate replacement race for local officials. See id.
310. See id. at 19-20.
311. For a contrary view, see Michael B. Salerno & Mark Paul, The replacement election
in the recall is unnecessary; here’s why, CALMATTERS (Sept. 1, 2021), https://calmatters.org/
commentary/2021/09/the-replacement-election-in-the-recall-is-unnecessary-heres-why/
(arguing that it is inappropriate for the legislature to provide by statute for a replacement
election system at all, and that existing constitutional succession-in-vacancy provisions should
apply instead).
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between the top-two field finishers, a proposal that has the purported
benefit of maximizing voter choice.312 But a separate election is costly
and burdensome. Unless the recall coincides with a regular election, it
requires two separate elections and doubles a recall’s cost.313 Having a
separate day for a replacement vote also potentially drives down voter
turnout. And the new separate replacement election arguably converts
the recall into a special election rerun of the gubernatorial contest.
The better choice is a same-day replacement question with rankedchoice voting. Rather than selecting one replacement candidate, voters
would rank the replacement candidates in order of preference. The
candidate with the lowest vote total is eliminated in successive rounds,
and their votes transfer to other candidates until one candidate has a
majority. That permits California to keep its current system of a twopart ballot with a simultaneous replacement. It resolves concerns about
plurality replacements and avoids the increased costs of a separate
replacement contest. Therefore, ranked-choice voting is well-suited to
recall elections where support can be divided between dozens of
candidates.
VI. CONCLUSION
The power to recall elected officials in California is a net benefit to
democracy and civil society. The recall is a feedback mechanism on
official policy. It can strengthen the democratic process by checking
elected officials’ power, removing officials who fail to govern in
satisfactory ways, and ensuring that officials stay accountable to the
electorate. Despite its relative ease of qualification and approval, the
California recall has been a historical rarity, a fact that undercuts
concerns about the state’s recall process being overpowered and claims
that it is prone to overuse. Instead, California’s existing recall system
strikes a good balance in the value set tradeoff between protecting the
ballot by preventing abuse, while preserving voter power and access to
the ballot.314 There are some meritorious reform proposals for the
California recall that focus on fixing its unclear procedures rather than
attempting to restrict ballot access. A powerful tool like the recall should
have clear and fair rules that promote ballot integrity. Yet making the
recall too difficult to use also risks making it unavailable for the

312. Note that the legislature considered and rejected switching to this system in 1915.
BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 76.
313. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 48. Still, Zimmerman notes that “[d]emocracy costs
the taxpayers money, yet no one objects to the cost of regular elections.” Id. at 130.
314. See BIRD & RYAN, supra note 9, at 61-62.
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electorate to remove bad actors.315 And raising the qualifying signature
requirement more than a modest amount would make the recall
inaccessible to all but the wealthiest interests—the same actors the
Progressives intended to combat with the recall. Accordingly, any
reforms should keep the recall accessible to average voters.

Figure 1 - Total Statewide Recalls 1911–2020
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Figure 3 - Statewide Recall 1911–2020
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Figure 4 - Statewide Recalls by Branch
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Figure 5 - Gubernatorial Recall Attempts 1911–2020
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Figure 6 - Average Recalled or Failed Margin by Year
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Figure 7 - Recall Attempts, By Population Size
100%
100%
90%
80%

84%

85%

78%

75%
75%
y = -0.0149x + 0.8398
R-rate

70%
60%
50%

45%

40%
38%
30%

25%
18%

20%

17%

21%
13%

10%

11%

Q-rate

0%
<1000

1000-10K

10K-50K

50K-100K

L-rate

100k+

Voting District Population Size
*Resigned, removed by
Leave Office Rate (% of All Attempts) council, etc are included in
“Qualify for Ballot” category
Qualification Rate* (% of All Attempts)
Removal/Resignation Rate* (% All Attempts That Qualify for
Ballot)
Linear (Removal/Resignation Rate* (% All Attempts That
Qualify for Ballot))

540

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

Figure 8 - Average Victory/Defeat Margin, By Office
Type
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Table 1 – Recalls by Governor
Governor
Culbert Olson (D)
Pat Brown (D)
Ronald Reagan (R)
Jerry Brown (D)
George Deukmejian (R)
Pete Wilson (R)
Gray Davis (D)
Arnold Schwarzenegger (R)
Jerry Brown (D)
Gavin Newsom (D)

Years in Office
1939–1943
1959–1967
1967–1975
1975–1983
1983–1991
1991–1999
1999–2003
2003–2011
2011–2019
2019–Present

Number of Recalls
5
3
3
5
11
6
3
7
5
6

Table 2 – Signature requirement by population size
Signature Requirement (% of
Registered Voters)
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%

Number of Registered Voters in
District
> 1,000
1,000 – 10,000
10,000 – 50,000
50,000 – 100,000
100,000 +

Table 3 – Summary of 2010–21 Local Recall Attempts by Result
Grand total past and pending local
recalls
Total past local recall petitions
Underway
Scheduled
Result of past recall attempt
Did not qualify
Qualified for the ballot
Qualified that succeeded
Resigned
Resigned to take another office
Council voted to remove official
Total vacated offices by any means

560
555
40
5
Total
416
139
86
23
1
2
110

75% of all past recalls
25% of all past recalls
62% of qualified recalls
17% of qualified recalls
0.7% of qualified recalls
1% of qualified recalls
79% of qualified recalls
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Table 4 – Summary of Recall Rates, by Office Type
Office Type
City Council,
Other City
Positions
Law, Law
Enforcement
Mayoral
County
Supervisor
Education
Special
District w/o
Water

Total
Attempts

Leave Rate

Qualification
Rate

Removal
Rate

191

20%

26%

78%

15

20%

29%

75%

70

16%

26%

61%

33

6%

9%

67%

190

19%

22%

86%

51

33%

33%

100%

Table 5 – Recall Qualification Requirements by State
Signature requirement:
States using threshold:
40% of turnout in the last election
25% of registered voters
25% of turnout
20% of eligible voters
15% of eligible voters
15% of turnout
15% of turnout and the support of
a bipartisan grouping of
legislators
12% of turnout for the office

10% of registered voters

10% of turnout

Kansas
New Jersey
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota,
Washington, Wisconsin
Idaho, Louisiana
Georgia
Oregon, Rhode Island
Illinois
California (12% of the 12,464,235
votes cast for Governor in 2018 is
1,495,709)
Montana (10% of the 752,538
registered voters in 2020 is 75,253)
Virginia (which may not have a recall
law impacting state officials or
specifically Governors; it also uses a
procedure called recall trials, where if
enough signatures are gathered a judge
holds a trial rather than an election).
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Table 6 – Qualifying Signature Requirements by State,
Population, and Rule316

Sources
Population and registered voters: US Census (November 2020 presidential
election) Table 4a
Eligible voters and turnout (total ballots counted): US Elections Project
(2020 November General Election Turnout Rates)
California Little Hoover Commission, Reforming the Recall Report #266,
Appendix1 February 2022.
Assumptions
Assume Governor targeted in each state.
Partial results rounded up to nearest whole number.

316. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF
NOVEMBER 2020: TABLE 4A (2021), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-585.html (click “Table 4a” to download) (population
and registered voters data); LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 152, at 33 app. 1; Michael
P. McDonald, 2020g: 2020 November General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS
PROJECT (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.electproject.org/2020g (eligible voters and turnout
data). The following assumptions were made for the data in this table: assume the governor is
targeted in each state, partial results are rounded up to the nearest whole number, and “vote
in the district” provisions translate to “state” for statewide officers such as the governor.
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“Vote in the district” provisions translate to “state” for statewide officers
such as the Governor.
*Louisiana requires 20% of “qualified electors” (registered voters) for a
statewide office. RS 18:1300.2(d) “If one hundred thousand or more
qualified electors reside within the voting area, the petition shall be signed
by at least twenty percent of the electors.”
Data key
Sheet is sorted high to low by column G “IF by eligible”

Table 7 – Total Recall Attempts, by Population Size
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